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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The past two decades have seen life in America dramatically altered by 
the digital revolution.1  Minors, including both small children and mature 
adolescents,2 are increasingly involved in online activities that generate 
 
 *  Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, Brigham Young University.  Many thanks to my 
excellent student researchers, editors, and collaborators—Eli McCann, Brandon Crowther, and 
Timothy West—and the faculty participants of various workshops and conferences who provided 
feedback on various drafts of this article. 
 1.  See, e.g., JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 1–15  (2008); David Buckingham, Is There a Digital 
Generation?, in DIGITAL GENERATIONS: CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE, AND NEW MEDIA 1–12 (David 
Buckingham & Rebekah Willet eds., 2006). 
 2.  A legal “infant” or “minor” refers to anyone under age eighteen in almost all states.  5 
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter WILLISTON].  The 
adult in such transactions, whether acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another person or entity, 
is sometimes referred to as the “major.”  The age of majority was generally lowered to eighteen in 
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profits for online service providers (OSPs).  According to recent studies, 
approximately ninety-five percent of teens ages twelve to seventeen were 
online in 2011,3 seventy percent go online daily, and nearly fifty percent go 
online several times a day.4  Eighty percent of those online teens used social 
network sites.5  Providers of such “free” web services do so intending to 
recover their costs and make significant profit from advertisements and other 
monetized features.  Economic incentives drive OSPs to increase their teen 
user base, as well as their adult user base.  In addition, because of youths’ 
widespread online presence, combined with increasing access to money,6 
“children comprise a significant segment of online consumers, a segment 
that is rapidly enlarging.”7  According to a 2010 Pew Research Center 
Internet study, “48% of wired teens have bought things online like books, 
clothing or music.”8  The most popular sites for minors include eBay, 
Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and MySpace,9 and almost three million minors 
make purchases online every month.10 
OSPs almost universally present their potential online customer or user 
with an adhesive contract containing extensive administrative terms.  These 
ongoing licensing agreements—intended to govern use of e-mail, online 
games, and other forms of intellectual property services, as well as 
commitments made in creating an account for purchasing goods—are 
typically identified as “Terms of Service,” “Terms of Use,” “Conditions of 
Use,” “Terms and Conditions,” “End User License Agreements,” and so 
 
the early 1970s.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. a (1981) (“49 States have 
lowered the age of majority, either generally or for contract capacity, to less than twenty-one; 
usually, the age is eighteen.”). 
 3.  AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET, TEENS, KINDNESS AND CRUELTY ON SOCIAL 
NETWORK SITES: HOW AMERICAN TEENS NAVIGATE THE NEW WORLD OF “DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP” 
15 (Nov. 9, 2011), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Teens-and-social-media.aspx. 
 4.  Id. at 16. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  MEDIAMARK RESEARCH INC., TEEN MARKET PROFILE 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.magazine.org/content/files/teenprofile04.pdf (revealing that in 2003, teens ages twelve to 
seventeen spent $112.5 billion). 
 7.  Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to 
Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 255 (2008) (citing RONALD J. MANN & 
JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 202 (2d ed. 2005)); see also Larry Cunningham, A 
Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their 
Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 293 (2006) (“Minors make a great deal of 
contributions to the marketplace as consumers, employees, and sellers.”). 
 8.  AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA & MOBILE INTERNET USE 
AMONG TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 4 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx. 
 9.  ROBERT BROWN & RUTH WASHTON, PACKAGED FACTS, THE TEENS MARKET IN THE U.S. 
54–56 (June 2007) (citing SIMMONS MARKET RESEARCH BUREAU, TEENS NATIONAL CONSUMER 
SURVEY (2006)). 
 10.  Id. at 53 (listing 12.4% of the roughly twenty-five million teen population as having made a 
purchase in the last thirty days). 
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forth (hereinafter collectively and singularly “TOS”).  These contracts may 
be characterized as “clickwrap,” “browsewrap,”11 or other “wrap” 
contracts,12 referring to the method of formation.13  TOS have generally been 
found to be enforceable as a matter of contract law, although some courts 
and many commentators have challenged this result by suggesting that TOS 
are almost never read, comprehended, or negotiated, and frequently invoke 
very little evidence of assent, even when the included terms are not 
unconscionable.14  Even if generally enforced against adults, minors can 
frequently void TOS under the traditional infancy doctrine. 
The infancy doctrine, although subject to some narrow defenses, permits 
avoidance of any contract entered into by a minor.  Avoidance is permitted 
throughout minority and for a reasonable time after reaching adulthood, so 
long as the minor has not ratified the contract as an adult.15  Disaffirmance 
does require that the minor return any benefit received as consideration on 
the contract, to the extent it is still in the minor’s possession.16  In most 
jurisdictions, the minor is also entitled to restitution of the consideration 
already conferred on the adult pursuant to the contract.17  In a dozen states, 
the adult has a right to offset the depreciation of the consideration from the 
amount paid back to the minor.18  But in most states, the minor is entitled to 
repayment without deduction. 
 
 11.  See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006) (describing 
“clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 
n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (using “clickwrap”). 
 12.  Maybe we will soon see a court using “cookiewrap.”  For an explanation of how cookies can 
be implicated as contracts, see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Consent Revisited, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 
(2010) (explaining how cookies have capabilities to accept terms automatically). 
 13.  For a more complete discussion of wrap contracts and the trends in judicial enforcement, see 
Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browseraps: How 
the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. (forthcoming 
2012). 
 14.  See infra Part III.A. 
 15.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:17; BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CASES, 
DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 422 (2003).  For additional discussion of the infancy doctrine 
generally and the necessities exception, see Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy 
Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47 (2012). 
 16.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. c (1981). 
 17.  See, e.g., Webster St. P’ship, Ltd. v. Sheridan, 368 N.W.2d 439, 444 (Neb. 1985) (holding 
that upon disaffirmance of the lease, the adult was required to refund to the minors the entire amount 
of the lease and the security deposit, even though the adult had no right of offset for the value to the 
minors of occupying the apartment). 
 18.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:16 (“Although the weight of authority still permits an infant 
buyer to recover the price paid merely upon offering to return the property, if any, remaining in her 
hands, without accounting to the seller for its depreciation or its use, there is an increasing number of 
jurisdictions that allow the seller to deduct for such depreciation and use.”); id. at n.13 (listing 
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Online markets are increasingly dependent on minors.19  With the threat 
of the infancy doctrine, one would think merchants would be extremely 
reluctant to deal with minors for any transaction that is not de minimus or for 
food, clothing, or shelter (and even then, most minors providing these goods 
for themselves are not providing “necessities”).20  And yet, the lure of profits 
appears to have overcome the fear of legal disaffirmance, at least so far.  But 
the infancy doctrine cannot be dismissed as an insignificant risk.  Once 
minors, and their parents, catch on to the fact that the legislatures of almost 
every state and the vast majority of courts still strictly affirm the doctrine, 
the impact on businesses targeted largely at minors may be severe.21 
As I discuss elsewhere,22 the emergence of a significant market relying 
on unemancipated teens to consume purely discretionary goods and services, 
and various other changes in the way we think about teens, may warrant a 
serious reassessment of the infancy doctrine and its existing exceptions.  The 
doctrine may be unwarranted when asserted by a minor to evade the 
payment of a standard, publicized price in a part of the market that is truly 
competitive and for which information is readily available.  But this does not 
mean the doctrine need be thrown out entirely.  Any reassessment must be 
thoughtful and limited unless and until we have current evidence 
establishing that minors no longer need some or all of the doctrine’s 
protections or that the doctrine is being regularly abused.  Such a 
reassessment must be sensitive to context and consider whether changes in 
the infancy doctrine should be undertaken first with brick-and-mortar 
transactions or TOS, and whether changes should be experimental and 
incremental or encompassing.  At this point, the infancy doctrine is the law, 
and it is one mechanism for encouraging online businesses to reign in their 
greed both in targeting children and in catching all users with hidden, 
overreaching contract terms. 
With the exception of older hornbooks and collations,23 a few cursory 
mentions of the doctrine in practitioner guides, and brief summaries of 
infancy doctrine implications in other fields of law—such as the juvenile 
 
twelve states that allow depreciation deductions).  The depreciation offset applicable in some states 
is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 94–103. 
 19.  The spending power of teens is discussed infra Part IV.A. 
 20.  See Julie Cromer Young, From the Mouths of Babes: Protecting Child Authors from 
Themselves, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 431, 457 (2010) (“Because most services do not meet the category 
of necessity or other unavoidable contract, courts have allowed minors to disaffirm their contracts 
for services.”). 
 21.  The reasons why the infancy doctrine is currently underused, and the potentialities that will 
bring it to the forefront, are discussed in Preston & Crowther, supra note 15. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See, e.g., 43 C.J.S. Infants § 209 (2004); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 74 (2010); JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS §§ 8.1–.8 (6th ed. 2009); WILLISTON, supra note 
2, §§ 9:1–:25. 
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justice system and criminal culpability,24 immigration and asylum for 
minors,25 and medical consent26—very few sources devote more than a 
footnote to the infancy doctrine.  Of the publications that treat the infancy 
doctrine with more than a perfunctory summary, most are student or recent 
graduate work.  Very few are scholarly engagements primarily aimed at 
infancy doctrine theory and application.  Even then, the student and faculty 
treatments in the last decade are of limited usefulness, a matter discussed in 
detail below.27  This article provides solid foundations for a discussion of 
where the doctrine fits, in the face of a rising youth market and the digital 
revolution.  This article considers the implications of the extant infancy 
doctrine in the online context. 
Part II.A covers the general parameters of the infancy doctrine.  Part 
II.B dispels the notion that the doctrine will not be applicable to online 
services once the service has been used or consumed.  This subpart critiques 
the primary analysis of the one case that has addressed the infancy doctrine 
in the online arena—A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC.28  Although this case appears 
to create or expand an infancy doctrine defense based on the use of benefits, 
the court misapplies the law.  Part II.C addresses a possible secondary 
explanation of iParadigms and the seemingly eternal question of whether the 
infancy doctrine can be used as a sword, whatever that means in various 
jurisdictions and contexts.  Any suggestion that such a restriction eviscerates 
the doctrine’s application is singularly unfounded.  Part II.D explores 
another infancy doctrine defense that apparently is providing false comfort 
to some online merchants.  This defense is based on a fraudulent 
misrepresentation of age.  The mere recital of adulthood is unlikely to 
provide any support for the assertion of this defense and OSPs take no 
further steps to require verification.  Part II.E tackles the only other basis 
commonly raised for suggesting the infancy doctrine does not or should not 
apply online.  It describes why a minor’s advanced technical skills are not 
relevant to the policies of the infancy doctrine and, in fact, might emphasize 
the minor’s lack of caution in making legal commitments online. 
 
 24.  See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding of 
Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 58 JUV. & 
FAM. CT. J., Summer 2007, at 1, 2. 
 25.  See Charles H. Kuck & Grace Kennedy, Children in Immigration Proceedings, in 
LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARIES 3–4 (2007). 
 26.  See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across 
Legal Disciplines (forthcoming). 
 27.  See infra notes 41–51 and accompanying text. 
 28.  544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. 
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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Part III focuses on the peculiarities of online contracting.  Part III.A 
briefly provides context for the current state of contract law doctrine and the 
increasing laxity in maintaining traditional protections against falling 
unintentionally into serious contractual burdens.  Part III.B reviews the 
major objections to enforcing many TOS and assesses whether other 
contract doctrines provide sufficient basis for policing the abuses of TOS.  
This subpart concludes that, if the infancy doctrine needs to be limited to 
better accommodate current market needs, the online TOS is not the best 
place to begin. 
Part IV predicts the collision of the infancy doctrine and a market ever 
more greedy to engage minors. Part IV.A addresses minors’ economic 
power, whether online businesses are less at risk because they do not take 
cash, and the extent to which a parent or other entity secondarily guarantees 
the payment of online financial promises or reimbursement for money 
refunded to a minor under the infancy doctrine.  Part IV.B considers the 
more subtle economic costs associated with minors’ ability to avoid contract 
terms even if the service is free or the right to payment is not challenged.  
Part IV.C outlines the options available to online businesses and offers 
recommendations for how OSPs could and should respond to an upswing in 
infancy doctrine claims. 
II.  PORTING INFANCY DOCTRINE INTO CYBERSPACE 
To date there has been no successful campaign to devise a new body of 
contract law for cyberspace.29  Generally, courts attempt to apply the same 
principles and doctrines when considering online contracts that apply 
elsewhere, although the context of the Internet and electronic goods and 
 
 29.  The highlights of the somewhat tortured interchange on the issue of whether the Internet 
should be governed by a “new” body of cyberlaw, rather than by existing real-world law applied by 
analogy, are laid out by Ann Bartow in a recent book review.  Ann Bartow, A Portrait of the Internet 
as a Young Man, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1079, 1098–100 (2010) (reviewing JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008)).  In short, after an extensive debate on the 
question between David Johnson and David Post, Judge Easterbrook made a parody of the concept 
of a cyber-specific “law,” which spurred a cottage industry of disputing and defending the point (and 
insulting each other) involving Larry Lessig, Declan McCullagh, David Post, Jack Goldsmith, Marc 
Rotenberg, and Steve Bryant.  Id. (citing David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The 
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and 
the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 231 (1999); 
David G. Post, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1439 (2000); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy: (What 
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.*, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/ 
01_STLR_1; Steve Bryant, What Larry Doesn’t Get, README (May 4, 2003), 
http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/ReadMe/article.php%3Fid=141.html; and others). 
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services does suggest some additional concerns.  This part begins with a 
brief overview of the infancy doctrine.  I then address the four issues most 
pertinent to the intersection of the infancy doctrine and online contracts.  
First, I dissect the ruling in A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC,30 a case involving an 
online TOS that is regularly cited as providing a path around the doctrine.  
Second, I dispel the notion that the maxim—the infancy doctrine cannot be 
used as a sword—gives a judge the right to override any of the established 
elements of the doctrine.  Third, I explain why OSPs may not avert 
application of the infancy doctrine by a recital of age buried in a TOS.  And, 
finally, I consider how a minor’s technological skills figure into the 
calculation required by the infancy doctrine. 
A.  Infancy in a Byte 
The infancy doctrine,31 the notion that a person who enters into a 
contract while under legal age may later void the contract, can be traced to 
the fifteenth century,32 if not earlier.  The continued application of the 
doctrine is based on the presumption that minors are generally more 
vulnerable to exploitation than adults and less capable of comprehending the 
nature of the legal obligations associated with a contract.33  For ease of 
administration and clarity in application, the rule was settled with a 
 
 30.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473. 
 31.  See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.4 (4th ed. 2004); PERILLO, supra 
note 23, §§ 8.2–.8; JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 24 (4th ed. 2001).  See 
also Melvin John Dugas, Comment, The Contractual Capacity of Minors: A Survey of the Prior Law 
and the New Articles, 62 TUL. L. REV. 745, 746–54 (1988) (providing a detailed discussion of early 
developments of infancy protections in French and Roman law and how these principles became 
incorporated into Louisiana law). 
 32.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:2. 
 33.  City of New York v. Stringfellow’s of N.Y., Ltd., 684 N.Y.S.2d 544 (App. Div. 1999). 
Infancy, since common-law times and most likely long before, is a legal disability and an 
infant, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is universally considered to be lacking 
in judgment, since his or her normal condition is that of incompetency.  In addition, an 
infant is deemed to lack the adult’s knowledge of the probable consequences of his or her 
acts or omissions and the capacity to make effective use of such knowledge as he or she 
has. It is the policy of the law to look after the interests of infants, who are considered 
incapable of looking after their own affairs, to protect them from their own folly and 
improvidence, and to prevent adults from taking advantage of them. 
Id. at 550–51.  In this case, an adult establishment attempted to skirt the city’s zoning ordinances by 
allowing children to enter if they signed a waiver releasing the establishment from any liability for 
any damage caused to them by viewing uncovered female breasts.  Id. at 550. 
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categorical age line without regard to whether any particular individual is 
mature or infantile.34 
Generally, the operation of the doctrine is straightforward, although 
subject to a few defenses.  I more thoroughly explain the doctrine’s nuances 
elsewhere.35  Here, I briefly overview the defenses that could be applicable 
to the enforcement of TOS and, in the next two subparts, I illustrate two 
issues of the doctrine’s application in the context of a significant recent case. 
The most widely applicable defense to the infancy doctrine is that the 
contract provided necessities for the minor.  Social networking, music 
downloads, and e-mail accounts are not necessities (. . . at least not yet).  
Additionally, even items that would normally be considered necessities may 
not qualify because most teens with computer access can rely on parental 
financial support.  Under the doctrine, if minors could have food, clothing, 
medical care, and other necessities provided by a parent, it is not essential 
for them to contract to survive, and thus, there is no need to immunize adults 
who contract with them.36  Even if the adult party to the contract 
successfully asserts the defense of necessities, the historical rule provides 
that the minor must then pay the quantum meruit value of the consideration 
the minor received under the contract; it does not reinstate the contract for 
all purposes.37 
The emancipation defense only applies if the minor is married, in the 
military, or kicked out of both parents’ homes.38  Although rarely applicable, 
this defense could serve to bind some minors to a contract made online if the 
OSP could establish these facts.  However, this defense does not provide 
much advance protection for OSPs.  Determining emancipation prior to 
online contracting is difficult unless the OSP is willing to ask for marriage 
data or enlistment status before contracting, which would likely be deemed 
invasive.  As a result, OSPs should not assume this defense will protect 
them. 
The “retains benefit” defense is an attempt to mitigate the economic loss 
of the contracting adult.  In most jurisdictions this defense means that to be 
entitled to void the contract a minor must return any consideration still in the 
minor’s possession.39  But courts have found that returning damaged or used 
 
 34.  MURRAY, supra note 31; BLUM & BUSHAW, supra note 15; Preston & Crowther, supra note 
26. 
 35.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 15. 
 36.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:21. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. § 9:4. 
 39.  Id. § 9:14. 
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consideration, such as a wrecked car or half-used goods, is sufficient.40  
Thus, while a minor seeking to void an online TOS will no longer be 
allowed to use the service, the fact that the minor has benefited from the 
service in the past is not grounds to prevent voiding the contract. 
An adult who relies in good faith on a reasonable investigation of the 
other party’s age may, in some states, assert fraudulent misrepresentation of 
age as a defense,41 and, in other states, bring an action in tort for fraud.42  But 
even in jurisdictions that allow the defense, generally by statute, it has been 
limited to instances of bad faith or active misrepresentation on the part of the 
minor.43  Additionally, to qualify for this defense, adults have a duty to 
investigate sufficiently so they can then rely in good faith and reasonably.44  
This is because the policies of the infancy doctrine presuppose that adults 
know that minors have incentives to lie about their age, especially online 
where they perceive themselves as anonymous.  Many TOS include, 
somewhere in the middle of their dense legalese, a statement that the user is 
age eighteen or older, or of legal age.  The use and actual effectiveness of 
such a representation in creating good faith and reasonable reliance are 
discussed in greater detail in Part II.D below. 
In rare and exceptional cases, courts have found that the conduct of a 
minor sinks to the level of bad faith that precludes use of the infancy 
doctrine.  For instance, a minor’s disaffirmance of a contract for the benefit 
of a third party is not in good faith and bars application of the doctrine.45  
Malicious destruction of the consideration or an unnecessary act done out of 
spite or to punish the adult would also qualify as bad faith.  In this sense, the 
doctrine requires clean hands in the process of entering and voiding the 
contract.  An example is Rivera v. Reading Housing Authority,46 where the 
court held that this principle forbids minors from using infancy “to practice 
 
 40.  See, e.g., Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 563–64, 567 (Wis. 1980) (finding that a 
minor who disaffirmed a contract and returned a damaged car to the seller was not liable for the 
damage to the car or any depreciation in value). 
 41.  See, e.g., Nichols v. English, 154 S.E.2d 239 (Ga. 1967); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 101 
(2010). 
 42.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:22; see also Royal Fin. Co. v. Schaefer, 330 S.W.2d 129, 130 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (“[A]n infant who induces another to contract with him by misrepresenting that 
he is of age to the adult’s resulting injury, is liable in tort.”). 
 43.  43 C.J.S. Infants § 151 (2004). 
 44.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-103 (West 2010) (“No contract can be thus disaffirmed in 
cases where, on account of the minor’s own misrepresentations as to his majority . . . the other party 
had good reasons to believe the minor capable of contracting.” (emphasis added)). 
 45.  43 C.J.S. Infants § 225 (2004) (“The right to disaffirm will not be extended beyond the 
required limits, and it is not given to be exercised for the advantage of others than the infant.”). 
 46.  819 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
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unconscionable business methods,” such as voiding an employment contract 
in order to compete with an employer.47  This exception is discussed in Part 
II.E below.  But very few cases raise a bad faith defense. 
This article does not purport to address every nuance of the infancy 
doctrine and every emerging trend,48 but rather only those pertinent to the 
typical online contract.  Some other context-specific defenses to the infancy 
doctrine seem to be emerging in some states.  These include defenses to a 
minor’s attempt to avoid a waiver given as a condition for participation in 
children’s recreational sports sponsored by volunteers,49 and perhaps an 
attempt to avoid an arbitration provision in a contract for necessary medical 
treatment.50  Some states are also beginning to make an exception to the 
infancy doctrine in the context of a contract for the minor’s employment.51  
While an employment contract is unlikely to arise from a TOS, this 
exception is discussed below in another context.52 
Certainly, the infancy doctrine can often produce dramatic results.  The 
original infancy doctrine has over time become subject to the foregoing 
exceptions and defenses to mitigate the perceived harshness of its result in 
some situations, the lack of sympathy engendered by some minors’ conduct, 
and the doctrine’s obviously arbitrary age cutoff.53  The next section 
considers whether, without substantial legislative and judicial changes, any 
basis exists to suspect that the doctrine is not as potent online as it is in face-
to-face transactions. 
B.  iParadigms and the “I Keep Benefits” Defense 
Some are citing a recent case, A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC,54 as having cast 
doubts on the continued applicability of the infancy doctrine—at least with 
 
 47.  Id. at 1331–32 (quoting Pankas v. Bell, 198 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. 1964)). 
 48.  For a more thorough discussion of infancy doctrine nuances, see Preston & Crowther, supra 
note 15. 
 49.  See, e.g., Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998). 
 50.  See, e.g., Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965); Leong ex rel. Leong v. Kaiser 
Found. Hosps., 788 P.2d 164, 169 (Haw. 1990). 
 51.  See, e.g., Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997); Douglass v. Pfleuger Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129 (Haw. 2006). 
 52.  See infra Part II.C. 
 53.  “There is . . . a modern trend among the states, either by judicial action or by statute, in the 
approach to the problem of balancing the rights of minors against those of innocent merchants.”  
Dodson ex rel. Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1992).  The court goes on to say that 
evidence of this trend is found in the development of two defenses: (1) “[U]pon rescission, recovery 
of the full purchase price is subject to a deduction for the minor’s use of the merchandise,” and (2) 
“[T]he minor’s recovery of the full purchase price is subject to a deduction for the minor’s ‘use’ of 
the consideration he or she received under the contract, or for the ‘depreciation’ or ‘deterioration’ of 
the consideration in his or her possession.”  Id. at 547–48. 
 54.  544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. 
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/13/2012  2:03 PM 
[Vol. 39: 225, 2012] CyberInfants 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
235 
respect to contracts for online services.55  The Virginia district court’s 
language in the case suggests that a minor who uses the benefit of services 
prior to attempting to avoid the contract cannot then assert the infancy 
doctrine.56  The idea is that even kids cannot have their cake and eat it too.  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit evaded its responsibility to fully articulate the 
district court’s misapplication of the infancy doctrine’s exception for failure 
to return benefits by finding that the district court’s holding made full 
analysis of the infancy doctrine issue unnecessary.57  However, the circuit 
court’s footnote evidences that the cursory declaration of the district court 
was not supported by the authority it cited.58 
In iParadigms, four high school students sued iParadigms for copyright 
infringement of their work submitted through iParadigms’ anti-plagiarism 
software, Turnitin.59  Each of the students attended (or claimed to attend) 
schools that required students to submit their papers through Turnitin, which 
then produced plagiarism reports for the teachers.60  In addition, the schools 
had authorized Turnitin to archive the student submissions to be part of an 
ever-growing database against which to check future papers for plagiarism.61  
Each of the students created a profile, finishing with a click on “‘I Agree’ to 
the terms of the ‘user agreement’ (also referred to as the ‘Clickwrap 
Agreement’).”62  This TOS included an astonishingly sweeping waiver: 
 
 55.  Michael G. Bennett, The Edge of Ethics in iParadigms, 2009 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 
6, at 3, http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/12-iptf-Bennett.pdf (explaining that the judge 
in this case relied on an exception to the infancy doctrine that bars a minor from taking “the 
contract’s benefits while leaving behind its burdens”); Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 434 (“In 
[A.V. v. iParadigms] the court created an opinion that not only had immediate analytical impact for 
the contractual doctrine of infancy, but also had a more subtle, lasting impact on how courts are to 
interpret the terms and conditions of sites.”); see also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, 
Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2007–2008, 64 BUS. LAW. 199, 
211–12 (2008) (In A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, “[t]he court had no trouble rejecting the [infancy 
doctrine].  [T]he minor cannot accept the benefits of the contract without also bearing its 
burdens . . . .  Because plaintiffs had benefitted from their use of defendant’s product (they had, after 
all, satisfied their school paper requirements), they must accept any burdens imposed by the Click-
wrap Agreement.”); Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A 
Useful Vestige, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 620 (2011) (discussing iParadigms as an example that 
“courts are increasingly reluctant to disaffirm contracts” on the basis of infancy). 
 56.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481–82. 
 57.  iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 636 n.5. 
 58.  See infra text accompanying note 71. 
 59.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 477. 
 60.  Id. at 478. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id.  Oddly enough, in addition to this TOS, iParadigms’ website had another “Usage Policy,” 
even though the original TOS discussed in the text purported by its terms to be the “the entire 
agreement between the user and iParadigms’ with respect to usage of this web site.”  Id. at 479, 484–
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In no event shall iParadigms, LLC and/or its suppliers be liable for 
any direct, indirect, punitive, incidental, special, or consequential 
damages arising out of or in any way connected with the use of this 
web site or with the delay or inability to use this web site, or for any 
information, software, products, and services obtained through this 
web site, or otherwise arising out of the use of this web site, whether 
based in contract, tort, strict liability or otherwise, even if 
iParadigms, inc. or any of its suppliers has been advised of the 
possibility of damages.63 
The minors added written disclaimers on the copy of their submitted 
works, indicating they did not consent to the archiving of the works by 
Turnitin.64  Turnitin continued to archive the students’ works and the 
students brought an action through adult representatives.65 
Among other arguments, the students sought to void the terms of the 
TOS by asserting the infancy doctrine.66  The district court rejected this 
argument, declaring: 
In Virginia, a contract with an infant is voidable by the infant upon 
attaining the age of majority.  See Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601, 
608, 561 S.E.2d 711 (2002) . . . . However, the infancy defense 
cannot function as “a sword to be used to the injury of others, 
although the law intends it simply as a shield to protect the infant 
from injustice and wrong.”  MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 701, 
17 S. Ct. 961, 42 L. Ed. 326 (1897).  In other words, “[i]f an infant 
enters into any contract subject to conditions or stipulations, he 
cannot take the benefit of the contract without the burden of the 
 
85.  The court found the second Usage Policy unenforceable because it was not visible to users 
during account creation and it did not require a click or other indication of assent.  Id. at 485.  The 
court refused to accept the argument that this agreement became binding as a “browsewrap” when 
the minors used the Turnitin program.  Id. at 484–85. 
 63.  Id. at 478.  The waiver in the iParadigms’ TOS might have been challenged on 
unconscionability grounds.  It purports to waive liability for every action or inaction and does not 
exclude from its range intentional or recklessly negligent torts of its own employees.  Not all courts 
look kindly on a blanket waiver of any responsibility to the other party to the contract.  See, e.g., 
Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709, 712 (Idaho 1979) (“[It is] well 
established that courts look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability [blanket waiver of 
liability provisions] and construe such provisions strictly against the person relying on them, 
especially when that person is the preparer of the document.” (citing Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seabord 
Sur. Co., 318 P.2d 84 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Talley v. Skelly Oil Co., 433 P.2d 425 (Kan. 1967); 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Sec. Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959))). 
 64.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 480–81. 
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conditions or stipulations.”  5 Williston on Contracts § 9:14 (4th ed. 
2007).67 
The court then held that the students could not void the contract and 
retain the two “benefits” of using Turnitin: a “grade from their teachers” and 
the “standing to bring the present suit” granted by the TOS.68 
On appeal,69 the Fourth Circuit avoided directly touching upon the 
infancy doctrine issue, stating: “In light of our ‘fair use’ analysis, we decline 
to address the question of whether the terms of the Clickwrap Agreement 
created an enforceable contract between plaintiffs and iParadigms.”70  This 
sentence is supported by footnote five, which says, 
[T]he district court refused to void the contract based on the 
doctrine of infancy, see Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601, 561 S.E.2d 
711, 715 (2002) (“[A] contract with an infant is not void, only 
voidable by the infant upon attaining the age of majority.”), 
concluding that plaintiffs cannot use this doctrine as a “sword” to 
void a contract while retaining the benefits of the contract—high 
school credit and standing to bring this action, cf. 5 Richard A. 
Lord, Williston on Contracts § 9.14 (4th ed.) (“When the infant has 
received consideration which he still possesses, . . . he cannot, upon 
reaching majority, keep it and refuse to pay.”)71 
Like the district court, the Fourth Circuit cited Zelnick for the 
application of the infancy doctrine in Virginia.  However, the Fourth Circuit 
omitted any reference to the 1897 case cited by the district court that uses 
the “sword” language, which is discussed further in the next subpart.  The 
court then relied on the same Williston section cited by the district court.  
Note, however, that the signal used by the Fourth Circuit before the 
Williston cite is cf.  In addition, the Fourth Circuit includes as a parenthetical 
an excerpt from Williston that is more complete than the language cited by 
the district court.  According to The Bluebook, a cf. signal means that the 
“[c]ited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition 
but sufficiently analogous to lend support.”72  The Fourth Circuit’s use of a 
 
 67.  Id. at 481. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 70.  Id. at 645 n.8. 
 71.  Id. at 636 n.5. 
 72.  THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 55 (Columbia Law Review 
Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). 
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cf. signal here suggests that the Williston source differs from the conclusion 
of the district court.  In fact, the Williston section does differ.73  The section 
later clarifies that, if the minor no longer possesses any tangible returnable 
consideration, the “taking the benefit” defense fails.74  The cited Williston 
section contains no hint of an expanded meaning such as the “sword” 
language quoted from the 1897 case by the district court.75 
The infancy doctrine, in virtually every jurisdiction,76 only requires the 
minor to return any “consideration that he or she still possesses.”77  
Additionally, the benefits iterated by the district court do not even qualify as 
consideration given by iParadigms.78  The first benefit the students received, 
the benefit of getting a grade from their teachers and schools, was not given 
by iParadigms, and thus the benefit was not consideration given by 
iParadigms in the transaction sought to be voided.79  The second benefit 
noted by the district court, standing to sue, has never been conceptualized as 
consideration for a contract.80  Moreover, in this case, “if there was no user 
agreement, [the] students would still have standing to sue for copyright 
infringement.”81 
If we apply the “taking the benefit” defense to TOS for e-mail accounts, 
the benefit—using the service to communicate—would no doubt be 
terminated with respect to future use if the minor disaffirmed the TOS, but 
then there would seem to be nothing tangible to “return” from past service.  
Some jurisdictions go further and allow the infancy doctrine to be used in 
certain situations to punish the adult for entering the contract.82  In these 
cases, the minor is allowed to disaffirm the contract without even returning 
any consideration he or she still possesses.83 
 
 73.  See WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:14. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  A few jurisdictions have statutorily required that an infant is liable for the depreciation of the 
goods to be returned under a disaffirmed contract.  42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 91 (2010).  See, e.g., 
Sec. Bank v. McEntire, 300 S.W.2d 588 (Ark. 1957); Toon v. Mack Int’l Motor Truck Corp., 262 P. 
51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927); Barber v. Gross, 51 N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1952).  The offset for depreciation is 
further discussed infra Part II.C. 
 77.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:14. 
 78.  Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 455–57 (arguing that the benefit of receiving a grade from 
the school would not qualify under the infancy doctrine); Stephen Sharon, Comment, Do Students 
Turn Over Their Rights When They Turn in Their Papers? A Case Study of Turnitin.com, 26 TOURO 
L. REV. 207, 215–16 (2010). 
 79.  Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 457. 
 80.  Id. at 456.  Cromer Young further argues that “standing to sue” cannot be the consideration 
for a contract because it is “implicit in the formation of a contract.”  Id. 
 81.  Sharon, supra note 78, at 215–16. 
 82.  Daniel, supra note 7, at 256 (citing Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Wis. 1980); 
Weisbrook v. Clyde C. Netzley, Inc., 374 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)). 
 83.  Id. 
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After making quick work of dismissing the infancy doctrine, the district 
court directs most of its efforts to an alternative theory for its holding—that 
the retention of the shadow file of the students’ papers was fair use under the 
copyright laws.84  This is also where the Fourth Circuit directs its attention, 
also at some length.85  Instead of directly addressing whether the contract 
was voidable under the infancy doctrine, which, if true, would have been a 
simple, straightforward way to resolve the case, both courts spent 
considerable effort to reach the alternate and more credible holding on fair 
use.86 
Other aspects of the district court’s iParadigms opinion, and the facts of 
the case, suggest that the court’s reasoning would not necessarily translate to 
other cases, in any event.  The district court stresses the inherent ability of a 
school district to detect and respond to plagiarism, noting that a school can 
restrict the First Amendment rights of a student in a way that would be 
unconstitutional with respect to an adult.87 
The district court’s comments on the infancy doctrine, in this context, 
may be interpreted as dicta.  But even if taken literally, the district court’s 
conclusion misapprehends the retained benefit exception to the infancy 
doctrine.  Reliance on this case as a basis to deny minors a right to avoid a 
TOS is unfounded. 
C.  iParadigms, eSwords,88 and the Black Hat Defense 
The district court in iParadigms further justified its dismissal of the 
infancy doctrine by saying that the infancy doctrine may not be used as a 
sword.89  The court did not elaborate on what uses are swordlike, but the 
tenor of the language suggests that the court may have thought that the 
infancy doctrine cannot be used to take rights away from adults.  But, absent 
 
 84.  A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 85.  iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 638–45. 
 86.  Id.; iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
 87.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)).  The 
district court relies on Morse, the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” case, where the Supreme Court went as 
far as it ever has in respecting some speech rights for minors.  Thus, even Morse acknowledges the 
presumption that free speech concerns are circumscribed when dealing with minors.  Morse, 551 
U.S. at 403.  Moreover, the circuits have, since Morse, been reluctant to apply the liberalization 
portended in Morse outside of its narrow facts.  See, e.g., B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 
F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 88.  I credit this term to an online ministry: Rick Meyers, eSword: The Sword of the Lord with an 
Electronic Edge, ESWORD, http://www.e-sword.net/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 89.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
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a defense or exception, the adult’s right to enforce a contract always falls to 
the infancy doctrine. 
All the minors sought to do with the infancy doctrine in iParadigms was 
avoid the TOS contract containing the overreaching waiver.90  A review of 
other cases using sword language in the context of the infancy doctrine 
sheds light on the iParadigms court’s treatment of the infancy doctrine. 
Discussions about the infancy doctrine frequently employ metaphors of 
shields and swords.91  The concept is typically cited to a few very early cases 
that first associated the doctrine with a sword.92  The principle from these 
cases still applies as far as it is interpreted correctly.93  However, courts and 
commentators have inconsistent and unsupportable visions about what using 
the doctrine “as a sword” means in legal terms.  The language in iParadigms 
provides an excellent illustration of this opaque treatment. 
One of these principal cases using sword language is a 1920 case, Pettit 
v. Liston.94  It identifies the minor’s status as a plaintiff as one factor in 
limiting the right of the minor to recoup all the consideration previously paid 
to the adult.95  In Pettit, the minor was allowed to void the contract and the 
minor returned the consideration he still possessed, a used motorcycle, to the 
adult.96  The court, however, limited the minor’s recovery of money he had 
already paid to the adult by an amount equal to the depreciation in the value 
of the motorcycle to prevent the minor from using his infancy as a sword.97  
 
 90.  Id. at 478. 
 91.  See, e.g., id. at 481; Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 
150, 153 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National 
Letter of Intent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1330 n.209 (1989); 
Cunningham, supra note 7, at 294; Daniel, supra note 7, at 256; Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing 
the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
481, 485 (1994); John R. San Fellipo, Jr., Oregon’s Telephone Information Delivery Service Law: A 
Consumer Protection Step Too Far, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 455, 473–74 (1992); Rhonda Gay 
Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1302 
(2000); D. Ross Martin, Note, Conspiratorial Children? The Intersection of the Federal Juvenile 
Delinquency Act and Federal Conspiracy Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 859, 892 n.202 (1994). 
 92.  See, e.g., iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (citing MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688 
(1897)); Cozzillio, supra note 91, at 1330 n.209 (citing Rice v. Butler, 55 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 
1899); Pettit v. Liston, 191 P. 660, 661 (Or. 1920)); Daniel, supra note 7, at 256 n.135 (citing Rice, 
55 N.E. at 276); DiMatteo, supra note 91, at 485 n.20 (citing Zouch v. Parsons, (1765) 3 Burr. 1794 
(K.B.)). 
 93.  See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 225 (2004) (“An infant’s right to avoid or disaffirm a contract made 
during infancy is absolute and unconditional; however, infancy acts as a shield and not a sword.”). 
 94.  Pettit, 191 P. at 661. 
 95.  Id. at 662 (“We must not be understood as deciding at this time what would be the rule 
where the vendor is seeking to enforce an executory contract against the minor, which is a different 
question not necessarily involved in this case.”). 
 96.  Id. at 660. 
 97.  Id. at 662.  Professor Cozzillio uses sword language in precisely the same way.  Cozzillio, 
supra note 91, at 1330 n.209.  He ties the use of sword language to the minor’s position as a 
plaintiff, but being a plaintiff does not deprive the minor of the ability to use the doctrine to 
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Similarly, an 1899 case, Rice v. Butler,98 uses sword language to explain a 
holding that reaches the same result as Pettit, but omits any link with the 
minor’s status as plaintiff. 99  The Rice court required the minor “to offset the 
depreciation in value of the bicycle from the payments he had made.”100  The 
existence of an offset rule, and the holdings in both these cases, actually 
affirm that the minor can use the infancy doctrine to escape enforcement of 
the contract.  Thus, use as a sword describes a minor’s attempt to demand 
return of the full price paid upon return of the consideration, although the 
consideration has been damaged or suffered a loss in value. 
A dozen jurisdictions now apply this rule and allow an offset of the 
depreciation against the cash the adult must return to the minor upon 
disaffirmance.101  In Williston, the offset rule is acknowledged as a minority 
exception to the full restitution generally permitted, but it is not associated 
with sword language.  Williston says: 
Although the weight of authority still permits an infant buyer to 
recover the price paid merely upon offering to return the property, if 
any, remaining in her hands, without accounting to the seller for its 
depreciation or its use, there [are] an increasing number of 
jurisdictions that allow the seller to deduct for such depreciation and 
use.102  
 
disaffirm.  Pettit, 191 P. at 662.  Rather, when the minor is a plaintiff the court may require more 
than simply returning whatever consideration in is the minor’s possession in whatever condition.  Id. 
 98.  55 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1899). 
 99.  Id. at 275–76. 
 100.  Brian A. Darst, Speech at the Federal Publications Seminar: Basics of Commercial 
Contracting 6 (2007), available at BCC GLASS-CLE 1 (Westlaw) (summarizing the facts in Rice); 
see also Scott Eden Mgmt. v. Kavovit, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1990).  Requiring full 
restitution from the adult without any offset for benefits already used and unreturnable would put the 
infant “in a position superior to that which he would have occupied had he never entered into the 
contract with plaintiff.”  Id.  Retaining an advantage from the repudiated transaction is “using the 
privilege of infancy as a sword rather than a shield.”  Id.  Justice and fairness require a minor “to 
account for . . . reasonable use or deterioration in value” of an item upon disaffirmance.  W.E. 
Shipley, Annotation, Infant’s Liability for Use or Depreciation of Subject Matter, in Action to 
Recover Purchase Price upon His Disaffirmance of Contract to Purchase Goods, 12 A.L.R.3d 1174 
(1967) (citing Rice, 55 N.E. at 276). 
 101.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:16. 
 102.  Id. (listing cases from twelve jurisdictions, with the most recent case decided in 1992); see 
also Olson v. Veum, 222 N.W. 233, 233–34 (Wis. 1928) (“To sustain the judgment below is to 
overlook the substantial distinction between a mere denial by an infant of contract liability where the 
other party is seeking to enforce it and those cases where he, who was the minor, not only disaffirms 
such contract, but seeks the aid of the court to restore to him that with which he has parted at the 




 However, the offset rule does not apply widely, and it never applies 
beyond the amount of cash the adult would otherwise have to return.  If the 
depreciation is greater than what the minor has paid, the adult may keep the 
amount paid, but cannot seek further reimbursement.103  The minors in 
iParadigms did not ask for the return of any cash or other consideration, and 
so could not be subject to an offset.104  Thus, this interpretation of using 
infancy as a sword could have no meaning in this case. 
Sword language has also become associated with whether the minor is 
the plaintiff in the case.105  This interpretation developed because the court in 
Pettit mentions the minor’s status as plaintiff, and because the minor in Rice 
was also the plaintiff, although the Rice court does not tie that to its 
holding.106  Some current literature continues to link sword language to the 
notion that a minor may not use the doctrine as a plaintiff, but then 
acknowledges that such a rule no longer exists.  For instance, Professor 
Daniel states: 
Although the minority incapacity doctrine was initially intended to 
be used only as a shield and not as a sword, in many cases this is a 
distinction without a difference.  Generally, it is acknowledged that 
a minor may institute an action to disaffirm a contract and is not 
relegated to using his minority status as a defense.107 
Daniel cites Rice, but recall the consequence for using the doctrine as a 
sword in Rice was only the application of the offset rule.  Plaintiff or not, the 
minors in Pettit and Rice were allowed to disaffirm.108  Another example of 
this interpretation appears in Professor Hartman’s statement that “the power 
of disaffirmance constitutes both a sword and shield, as it may be used either 
 
making of the contract.  In the one case he is using his infancy merely as a shield, in the other also as 
a sword.”). 
 103.  Pettit v. Liston, 191 P. 660, 661–62 (Or. 1920). 
 104.  A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 105.  See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cooper, Note, Naked Before the Law: Reality Porn and the Capacity 
to Contract, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 353, 377 (2005) (“[C]ourts have had trouble with cases 
where a minor sues to dissolve a contract instead of using it as a defense.”).  To support this idea, the 
student author cites Zouch v. Parsons, (1765) 3 Burr. 1794 (K.B.), which provides that “[a] third rule 
deducible from the nature of the [infancy] privilege, which is given as a shield, and not as a sword, is 
that it never shall be turned into an offensive weapon of fraud and injustice,” which does not lend 
much support to a plaintiff/defendant distinction.  Id. at 1802 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106.  See Rice v. Butler, 55 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1899); Pettit, 191 P. 660. 
 107.  Daniel, supra note 7, at 256. 
 108.  See Rice, 55 N.E. 275; Pettit, 191 P. 660. 
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defensively or offensively.”109  Hartman cites Monahan v. Friederick for this 
truism, but it is a case which makes no reference to swords or shields.110 
Although there is minimal support for the idea that sword language ever 
equated to a minor’s inability to use infancy as a plaintiff, there is some 
sense that the plaintiff/defendant distinction might be relevant when 
considering the minor’s obligations upon disaffirmance.  The hornbook 
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts specifically discusses this distinction and 
states that that a minor who buys an item on credit and is then sued for non-
payment can disaffirm the contract and is only liable to return whatever 
consideration he still possesses.111  On the other hand, a minor who pays 
cash for the item and later seeks to disaffirm the contract and recover the 
purchase price is entitled to recovery of consideration paid, but is required to 
return the consideration he still possesses and the amount returned to the 
minor is offset by any depreciation in the consideration returned.112  
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts traces this plaintiff/defendant distinction 
back to Rice and Pettit and cites a number of other cases that support the 
offset rule.113  As discussed above, this depreciation rule does have support 
in a number of jurisdictions; however, its use is tied to whether the minor is 
seeking a return of consideration paid rather than whether the minor is a 
plaintiff in the case.  This confusion is understandable because in most 
instances, a minor seeking a return of consideration paid would be a 
plaintiff.  The minors in iParadigms were plaintiffs; however, because the 
sword language does not make a plaintiff/defendant distinction, and because 
Virginia has not adopted the offset rule,114 this sword interpretation would 
likewise be invalid had the district court intended this meaning. 
Sword language, without reference to the offset rule or plaintiffs, does 
show up occasionally in other infancy doctrine cases.  In Sheller v. Frank’s 
Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,115 the court refused to allow a minor employee to 
 
 109.  Hartman, supra note 91, at 1302. 
 110.  Monahan ex rel. Monahan v. Friederick, 455 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).  While 
Professors Daniel and Hartman make it clear that minors may use the infancy doctrine as plaintiffs, 
Daniel appears to suggest this was the original meaning, and Hartman appears to tie the term 
“sword” to offensive use as a plaintiff. 
 111.  PERILLO,  supra note 23, § 8.5(a). 
 112.  Id. § 8.5(b). 
 113.  Id. § 8.5(b) nn.10–11. 
 114.  See WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:16 (the state jurisdictions that have accepted the offset 
rule are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas). 
 115.  957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
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void the agreement to arbitrate contained in an employment contract.116  The 
court stated that “‘the privilege of minority . . . is to be used as a shield and 
not as a sword,’” and consequently that a “minor’s right to disaffirm in any 
case ‘should be exercised with some regard to the rights of others, certainly 
with as much regard to those rights as is fairly consistent with adequate 
protection of the rights of the minor himself.’”117  The court does not 
articulate what “adequate protection of the rights of the minor” is and, by 
refusing the right to avoid in that case, the court seems to be giving no 
protection to the minor.  How broadly can the declaration of the Sheller case 
be applied? 
Another explanation for the Sheller holding is that it is one of several 
courts who have recently recognized an exception to the infancy doctrine for 
employment contracts.118  For instance, in Douglass v. Pflueger Hawaii, 
Inc., the concurring judge stated that avoidance of the arbitration 
requirement in the minor’s employment contract was not allowed because 
infancy should not be used as a “sword to injure the defendants.”119  The 
majority opinion,120 which makes no mention of swords, reasons that the 
legislative grant permitting minors to be employed implies that minors 
should have capacity to enter enforceable employment agreements.121  If 
Sheller is not based on an employment exception, it appears to be simply 
wrong. 
Another example of a case using sword language to characterize another 
element of a well-known exception to the infancy doctrine is State Farm 
 
 116.  Id. at 153–54. 
 117.  Id. at 153 (quoting Shepherd v. Shepherd, 97 N.E.2d 273, 282 (Ill. 1951)). 
 118.  See, e.g., Robinson v. Food Serv. of Belton, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 n.1 (D. Kan. 
2005) (“[This] court does not believe that the Kansas Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, would 
permit these plaintiffs to disaffirm their employment contracts when those contracts were, on the 
whole, beneficial to those plaintiffs.”); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Captain D’s, LLC, No. CV04-281AA, 
2005 WL 6141649 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2005) (upholding an arbitration provision in a minor’s 
employment contract because thousands of Mississippi minors receive benefits of employment and 
compensation dependent on such contracts).  On an interlocutory appeal, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court remanded the case for a full trial because the dispute in the case was outside the scope of the 
arbitration agreement; consequently, the court did not address the infancy doctrine claim.  Smith ex 
rel. Smith v. Captain D’s, LLC, 963 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 2007).  See also Preston & Crowther, supra 
note 15 (discussing the employment exception to the infancy doctrine more fully).  But see Stroupes 
v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-133, 2005 WL 5610231, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2005) 
(rejecting the concept of an employment exception to the infancy doctrine). 
 119.  135 P.3d 129, 148 (Haw. 2006) (Acoba, J., concurring). 
 120.  Id. at 131–45 (majority opinion). 
 121.  Id. at 138 (“With respect to contracts of employment, it is apparent that, by relaxing the 
requirements for sixteen—and seventeen-year-olds to obtain employment, the legislature clearly 
viewed minors in this particular age group—being only one to two years from adulthood—as 
capable and competent to contract for gainful employment and, therefore, should be bound by the 
terms of such contracts.”). 
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Skivington.122  The court held that the 
sword principle does not allow a minor to unilaterally change a contract to 
impose additional obligations on the other party.123  Rather, a minor must 
“affirm or disaffirm the contract as a whole.”124  The minor purchased car 
insurance, but rejected uninsured motorist coverage and then, after an 
accident, wanted to disaffirm only the rejection of the uninsured coverage 
and be compensated from that accident.125  This denial of a partial avoidance 
and partial affirmance is an obvious result and is acknowledged in the 
Williston section cited by the district court in iParadigms.126 
Neither the Sheller nor the Skivington case sheds any light on what the 
district court in iParadigms meant in repudiating use of the infancy doctrine 
as a sword.  If anything, these cases suggest that whenever a court is 
applying an established defense, exception, or limit on the use of the infancy 
doctrine, it may pull out the maxim about the doctrine not being used as a 
sword, but such language does not seem to contain any substance beyond the 
established parameters of the infancy doctrine.  And none of these 
parameters seem to apply in iParadigms. 
There is one other possibility.  Outside of the minority offset rule, the 
most legitimate use of the sword metaphor seems tied to the situation where 
the minor has acted in bad faith, as discussed above.  In that situation, courts 
appear unwilling to follow the literal rules of the infancy doctrine, and 
instead apply equitable powers to circumvent traditional infancy rules while 
still claiming that the infancy doctrine applies.127  In the ordinary case, the 
right to use the doctrine to void the contract “is absolute and 
unconditional,”128 and, in fact, “[t]he rule relating to the avoidance of 
infants’ contracts should be liberally applied.”129  However, a court may 
refuse to recognize the infancy doctrine when a minor’s conduct is 
reprehensible.  Is it possible that the district court in iParadigms was 
 
 122.  28 Pa. D. & C.4th 358 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1996). 
 123.  Id. at 365–67. 
 124.  Id. at 365. 
 125.  Id. at 360. 
 126.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:14. 
 127.  See, e.g., MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 703 (1897) (minor was required to reimburse 
adult where she borrowed money to pay off encumbrances on the property, even though the 
consideration was technically no longer in the minor’s possession); Fifth Third Bank v. Gilbert, 478  
N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Ohio Mun. 1984) (refusing to allow a minor to disaffirm unauthorized charges 
she made with her father’s credit card because that would allow her to use infancy as a sword). 
 128.  43 C.J.S. Infants § 225 (2004). 
 129.  Id. 
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suggesting, with the sword language, that the minors in that case had gone so 
far as to exhibit bad faith? 
Professor Cromer Young suggests that the district court in iParadigms 
may have been reacting to the perceived “bad actor status” of the 
plaintiffs.130  Professor Cromer Young writes, 
The iParadigms court may have reached the right conclusion due to 
the bad-actor status of the minor authors—in this case involving 
cheating and plagiarism, it is difficult to see what objection the 
minors would have to the archiving of their works, unless they 
believed that future submitted works would be flagged because they 
raised alarming similarity to their works.131 
But there is no evidence in the opinion that any of the minor plaintiffs in this 
case plagiarized or were trying to escape the consequences of plagiarism.  In 
fact, one of the students submitted his work through Turnitin to a school he 
did not attend,132 and thus the school could not have issued academic 
sanctions against him in any event. 
The plaintiffs’ attorney, Robert Arthur Vanderhye, who also served as 
A.V.’s adult representative in the case, has brought at least one other case 
against iParadigms.133  Comparing this other case to iParadigms suggests 
that the motive in challenging the TOS in both cases was to obtain 
compensation for iParadigms’ use of others’ works to build the database on 
which the profitable business depends.  The defendant’s brief asserts that 
one of the parents and the attorney contrived the false submission to Turnitin 
for the purpose of the suit and thus, in a premeditated manner, clicked to 
accept the Usage Policy with no intention of abiding by it.134  Although this 
fact may be true, and courts may associate bad faith with entering an 
 
 130.  Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 458. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“[A.V.] used 
Turnitin to submit his written work to the University of California, San Diego (‘UCSD’), an 
educational institution in which A.V. was not enrolled.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V. 
ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 133.  In Christen v. iParadigms, LLC, No. 1:10cv620, 2010 WL 3063137 (E.D. Va. Aug. 4, 
2010), attorney Vanderhye attempted to use state law replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment to 
obtain compensation for students on whose work the profitable Turnitin depends.  Id. at *3.  The 
plaintiff in Christen was an adult when the work was submitted and the case raises no infancy 
doctrine issues.  Id. at *1.  The district court granted iParadigms’s motion to dismiss in Christen and 
held that all the claims are preempted by the Copyright Act and the fair use holding from the earlier 
Fourth Circuit case.  Id. at *7–9. 
 134.  iParadigms, LLC’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008) 
(No. 1:07 cv 293), 2007 WL 4298735. 
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agreement with intent to sue,135 the district court’s opinion does not suggest 
this is the reason for the holding, and such a reason would make the 
iParadigms holding on the infancy doctrine limited to such facts. 
Alternatively, although it would not explain the holding with respect to 
the other minors, the iParadigms court may have envisioned one of the 
minors, A.V., as a bad actor.  He misrepresented his school affiliation and 
identity and used another person’s identification and password that attorney 
Vanderhye discovered online.136  iParadigms counterclaimed against this 
student, alleging his “misuse” of the Turnitin system was a trespass to 
chattels, a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and a violation 
of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act.137  But it is highly unlikely that the 
district court meant to suggest the infancy doctrine was misused based on 
these alleged violations since the court found them to be harmless.  The 
district court easily dismissed all three of these counterclaims because 
iParadigms “fail[ed] to establish any actual damage or impairment to the 
Turnitin system as a result of A.V.’s allegedly unauthorized submissions.”138  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed this holding with respect to the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Virginia Computer Crimes Act, 
determining that iParadigms had showed evidence of qualifying damages.139  
However, this later contrary conclusion cannot be attributed to the district 
court or provide a reason for the district court to determine that the minors in 
the case acted in bad faith. 
Thus, the district court’s use of the maxim—the infancy doctrine cannot 
be used as a sword—does not appear to be relevant to any aspect of infancy 
law doctrine in this case and thus is not a basis for justifying the court’s 
refusal to apply the doctrine.  It is understandable that the district court in 
iParadigms would resonate with the maxim because it was not inclined to 
allow these students out of the TOS, but the maxim cannot be used as an 
excuse to disregard the clear application of the infancy doctrine.  The 
infancy doctrine allows minors to disaffirm contracts unless one of the well 
 
 135.  See, e.g., Habetz v. Condon, 618 A.2d 501 (Conn. 1992) (finding that the homeowner’s 
attempt to void his contract with his home builder after his house was built because the contract was 
missing a mandatory provision was in bad faith, and that the whole transaction evidenced bad faith 
on the homeowner’s part, and therefore he was precluded from voiding his contract). 
 136.  The Fourth Circuit tells us, “The password was provided to A.V. by plaintiffs’ counsel who 
obtained it by conducting an internet search.”  iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 635. 
 137.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 479. 
 138.  Id. at 486. 
 139.  iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 646 (“This broadly worded provision plainly contemplates 
consequential damages of the type sought by iParadigms—costs incurred as part of the response to a 
CFAA violation, including the investigation of an offense.”). 
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articulated defenses applies.  A court wishing to plow new ground and 
overturn an ancient doctrine established in every jurisdiction should offer 
some explanation. 
So far in this Part II, I have explained why reliance on iParadigms is 
misplaced, and that the retained benefits defense and the bad faith defense 
are unlikely to offer much comfort to OSPs.  I turn now to another defense 
frequently asserted with respect to a minor’s efforts to disaffirm an online 
TOS.  A glance through the terms in a wide variety of TOS for businesses 
likely to attract minors suggests that, if iParadigms does not save them, 
OSPs plan to rely on the fraudulent misrepresentation of age defense.  But 
such reliance will not be successful. 
D.  Trojan Horses and the (Mis)representation of Age Defense 
OSPs tuck representations of age into TOS, never in the first few 
paragraphs and sometimes several pages down.  OSPs do not provide any 
warning that they plan to rely on such representations or warn that to accept 
services if the representation is not true will result in consequences of any 
kind going forward.  In this way, OSPs seem to induce users to click (or 
browse) unaware of the significance of such a representation, which can be, 
and frequently is, in direct conflict with the actual personal information the 
user has entered during a prior step.  Like the Trojan horse, users accept 
such TOS without a second thought.  But “hidden” should not be as good a 
strategy in contract law as it is in war.  Clever or not, OSPs may fail to 
realize that the representation of age inside a TOS is not nearly as deadly as 
the contents of the ancient horse.  In this Part II.D, I first discuss the 
standards for establishing a defense based on misrepresentation of age.140  
Second, I address briefly the issues surrounding investigating age online.  
Finally, I describe what OSPs are doing to discover and respond to age and 
compare these efforts to the standards for the defense. 
As explained above in Part II.A, this defense is only available when the 
adult has undertaken reasonable investigation and relies in good faith on the 
results of the investigation.141  It requires more than a mere statement of 
inaccurate age.142  The adult has a duty to reasonably investigate age, 
notwithstanding the representation.  The reliance must be “justified” and in 
 
 140.  Fraudulent misrepresentation of age is, in some jurisdictions, a defense to the infancy 
doctrine, and in others, a tort claim that can be raised against a minor who seeks to disaffirm a 
contract.  See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.  In this article, I discuss both as a 
“defense.” 
 141.  WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:22 (stating that this rule is statutory in some jurisdictions). 
 142.  See, e.g., Gillis v. Whitley’s Disc. Auto Sales, Inc., 319 S.E.2d 661, 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1984) (holding that a minor’s misrepresentation of age does not bar him from disaffirming a 
contract). 
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“good faith.”143  For instance, in Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe,144 a minor 
affirmatively presented a fake identification.145  The court held that the fake 
ID was a mere attempt to defraud, and insufficient as a defense to the 
infancy doctrine, which requires satisfaction of a three-part test: (1) the 
minor misrepresented her age, (2) the minor intended for the other party to 
rely on the misrepresentation, and (3) the party was injured as a result of its 
actual and justifiable reliance.146 
Of course, the issue of investigating age is more complex online.  The 
law relating to the fraudulent misrepresentation defense and duty to 
investigate age was developed when most contracts were formed in person.  
Literature refers to the notion that red flags about age would arise visually.147  
What might be the equivalent online?  Certainly online age verification 
technology has been the subject of extended debate,148 even beyond the 
Child Online Protection Act (COPA) cases.149  Online age verification 
methods exist,150 and some are currently being implemented by certain 
online service providers.151  Proponents argue that these methods are as good 
as visual checks in at least raising the suspicion that age needs to be 
investigated.  “While these methods may not be one hundred percent 
effective in excluding minors, neither are the current methods [used] by 
 
 143.  A. D. Kaufman, Annotation, Infant’s Misrepresentation as to His Age as Estopping Him 
from Disaffirming His Voidable Transaction, 29 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1970); see also DiMatteo, supra 
note 91, at 497 (stating that the requirement is “reasonable reliance”). 
 144.  No. 03-05-00022-CV, 2005 WL 1940159 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2005) (citing and 
mirroring the elements of fraud discussed in Ernst & Young, LLP v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., 51 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2001)). 
 145.  Id. at *1. 
 146.  Id. at *4. 
 147.  Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors’ Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern 
Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205, 214–15 (1967) (quoting Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat’l Sec. Corp., 188 
N.E. 726, 728 (N.Y. 1934)). 
 148.  See, e.g., RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 39 (May 2006), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/ 
files/ric/Publications/e04062000.pdf. 
 149.  For an overview of the various cases and courts that addressed COPA and its age 
verification affirmative defense, see American Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 185–
86 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Third Circuit concluded that the “implementation of COPA’s affirmative 
defenses by a Web publisher . . . would involve high costs and also would deter [adult] users from 
visiting implicated Web sites.”  Id. at 197. 
 150.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 68 (2006) (proposing a scheme of “digital 
IDs” that could identify users online). 
 151.  For instance, “Lasseters Online requires a copy (which may be a faxed or a scanned copy) of 
a valid passport, drivers license, birth certificate or ‘Age identification card’ in order to prove that 
the player is not a minor.”  Jonathan Gottfried, Comment, The Federal Framework for Internet 
Gambling, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH., Feb. 2004, at 1, 12, 37 n.158 (citing Lasseters’ Terms of Use). 
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brick and mortar [businesses], which are often based on physical 
appearance.”152 
Further, necessity is the mother of invention and, if OSPs had sufficient 
incentive, development of age verification practices would become as robust 
as they are for online security services.153  In the 2008 joint statement with 
state attorneys general, MySpace agreed to develop age verification 
technology and to begin by organizing a task force focused on “finding and 
developing online identity authentication tools.”154  The task force’s final 
report does not conclude that age verification is not possible now, or in the 
future.155  Rather, the still contentious debate in the report is whether such 
technologies should be used.156  For purposes of this paper, I establish only 
that what most OSPs are currently doing is flagrantly insufficient to evoke 
the defense.  I defer to another day the issues of what technology or methods 
are available for age verification, their effectiveness against tech-savvy or 
dishonest youth, and the tradeoffs in terms of privacy for minors and 
burdens on adults using websites. 
A study of the current practices with respect to age makes it difficult to 
take seriously any claimed commitment of OSPs to avoid teenage customers.  
The practice of eBay and a few other sites with respect to pre-teens 
demonstrates that the OSPs know how to take precautionary measures.157  
 
 152.  Id. at 10. 
 153.  Some of the many services Norton offers, including Antispyware, are Antirootkit, Smart 
Firewall, Network Mapping & Monitoring, Anti-Spam, Identity Protection, and Download 
Protection, among others.  Norton AntiVirus 2011, NORTON, http://antivirus.norton.com/norton/ 
ps/1up_us_en_ght1.html?om_sem_cid=hho_sem_sy:us:ggl:en:e|kw0000004480|6514133956 (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2011). 
 154.  JOINT STATEMENT ON KEY PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES SAFETY 1 (Jan. 14, 
2008), available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press_releases/ 
2008/01/14/.pdf (MySpace agreed to organize a task force focused on “finding and developing 
online identity authentication tools.”).  The task force was convened and issued its final report on 
December 31, 2008.  ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY AND ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES: FINAL REPORT OF 
THE INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE TO THE MULTI-STATE WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL 
NETWORKING OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (John Palfrey, danah boyd 
& Dena Sacco eds., 2010) [hereinafter ISTTF REPORT]. 
 155.  In fact, the final report describes a variety of existing age verification practices.  ISTTF 
REPORT, supra note 154, at 30–31. 
 156.  Professor Palfrey’s introduction to the ISTTF Report explains: 
Some argue that the use of . . . age verification in particular, ought to be widespread, if 
not mandatory . . . .  Others argue that . . . [t]he extensive use of strong authentication and 
age verification technologies will not solve the problem, . . . and will bring with them 
negative externalities, including risks to innovation, free expression and privacy. 
Id. at xvi. 
 157.  eBay is such a recognized avenue of business and commerce for teenagers that teenager-
focused entrepreneurial advice websites offer articles on how teenagers can set up shop on eBay.  
See, e.g., R. Sharp, Run an eBay Business from Your Own Home—A Guide for Teens, EZINE 
@RTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Run-an-eBay-Business-From-Your-Own-Home---A-Guide-for-
Teens&id=680961 (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); Personal Finance: How Teens Can Make Money with 
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Juxtaposed against the numerous websites that take serious steps to prohibit 
pre-teen users from accessing services, websites which undertake no age 
inquiry or allow self-identified minors to register anyway, cannot argue that 
the online format has hoodwinked them into dealing with a minor against 
their will.  Adults who voluntarily enter transactions with minors seem 
willing to assume the risk that minors will void the contracts. 
OSPs’ treatment of youth under thirteen, as compared to youth under 
eighteen, illustrates that, first, OSPs are not making even a minimal effort to 
exclude older teens or to ascertain actual age, and, second, OSPs know how 
to exclude most users based on age disclosures when they so choose.  
Although it may be practically difficult to prevent persistent minors from 
improperly obtaining access to online services, hardly any OSPs do anything 
even to discourage underage customers or to prevent a minor from 
proceeding who has truthfully self-identified as under age. 
Twitter158 and Amazon,159 for instance, do not bother to inquire about 
age when opening an account.  MySpace,160 Facebook,161 Google,162 Blogger 
(a Google service),163 YouTube,164 and Yahoo!165 require a date of birth.  
They then block anyone who has entered an age that would make the person 
younger than thirteen years old from establishing an account or using the 
service.  OSPs are particularly leery of pre-teens because of the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA).166  COPPA’s provisions 
set forth restrictions on the gathering and use of pre-teens’ personal 
information.167  Rather than risk liability for failure to comply with the 
statute, most sites are programmed to refuse access to a person self-
 
eBay, ERUPTINGMIND EDUC., http://www.eruptingmind.com/teens-make-money-ebay/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2011). 
 158.  TWITTER, https://twitter.com/signup (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 159.  AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/flex/sign-in/select.html (enter e-mail address; then 
select “No, I am a new customer”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 160.  MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (click “Sign Up”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 161.  FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 162.  GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (click “Sign in”; then “Create an account now”) (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 163.  BLOGGER, http://www.google.com/accounts/ServiceLogin?service=blogger&passive=12096 
00&continue=http://blogger.com/home&followup=http://www.blogger.com/home&ltmpl=start#s01 
(click “Get started”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 164.  YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (click “Create Account”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 165.  YAHOO!, http://www.yahoo.com (click “New here? Sign Up”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
 166.  15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006); Jill Joline Myers & Gayle Tronvig Carper, Cyber Bullying: The 
Legal Challenge for Educators, 238 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6–7 (2008) (discussing some OSPs’ responses 
to COPPA’s preteen restrictions, primarily allowing access to services only to those over thirteen). 
 167.  15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (2006). 
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identified as under age thirteen.  In addition, some sites are programmed to 
continue to block a user who changes a birth date after being refused access 
for entering a date making the user under age thirteen. 
Efforts to similarly block teens ages thirteen to seventeen are extremely 
rare.  The registration page for eBay, on one hand, has a conspicuous notice 
that users must be eighteen years or older, and it follows through by 
blocking registration to users who give a birth date making them under 
eighteen.168  Most other OSPs do not take the same precautions.  
Facebook,169 Google,170 Blogger,171 YouTube,172 and Yahoo!173 each have a 
clause in their TOS agreement in which the user purportedly recites adult 
age qualification, but none of the sites prevent users who have entered birth 
dates that conflict with such a representation from establishing accounts and 
using their services.  Whatever is required for a reasonable investigation and 
good faith reliance on an intentionally fraudulent assertion of age, this will 
not qualify. 
In addition to the three defenses discussed above in Part II, another 
challenge that seems particularly pertinent to the application of the infancy 
doctrine in the online context is the superior expertise demonstrated by many 
minors in the use of technology.  The last section of this part addresses this 
argument. 
E.  Cyberpunk Versus Cybersense 
Children through time have learned how to deal with gadgets their 
parents never fathomed.174  Without question, in many homes minors are 
more comfortable with technology, especially the Internet, than adults.175  
 
 168.  EBAY, http://www.ebay.com (click “Register”) (last visited Oct. 27, 2011). 
 169.  Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, ¶ 4.5, http://www.facebook.com/ 
terms.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook TOS]. 
 170.  Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, ¶ 2.3, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Google TOS]. 
 171.  Blogger Terms of Service, BLOGGER, ¶ 1, http://www.blogger.com/terms.g (last visited Oct. 
29, 2011). 
 172.  Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, ¶ 12, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Oct. 29, 
2011). 
 173.  Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHOO!, ¶ 3, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-
173.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). 
 174.  See GUSTAVO S. MESCH & ILAN TALMUD, WIRED YOUTH: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF 
ADOLESCENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7 (2010) (explaining that today’s children differ in many 
ways from their parents’ generation, “express[ing] different values, attitudes and behaviours to those 
of their predecessors” as a result of growing up “[i]mmersed in [modern] technologies”). 
 175.  Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 45 (1995) (“Many parents complain that access by children to computer 
information . . . is very difficult to control.  This difficulty may even be exacerbated by the greater 
prevalence of computer literacy in minors than in adults.”); Daniel, supra note 7, at 241 (“[M]inors 
tend to be more comfortable and proficient with web-based devices than many adults.”); see also 
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For many American families, the children are the only ones with the 
required technological and language skills to use the Internet.176  One 
critique of the infancy doctrine is that technologically skilled minors could 
use the infancy doctrine to wreak havoc on innocent, unsuspecting, 
computer-challenged adults.177  Thus, the argument goes, minors’ 
technological savvy challenges the presumption of unequal bargaining 
power, which is one of the underlying assumptions of the infancy 
doctrine.178 
The technical skill argument is a red herring.  The need for the infancy 
doctrine arises from the flaws in the substantive decision to purchase a 
product or service and the legal implications of the often invisible and 
elaborate terms, not the mode by which the contract is executed.179  The 
infancy doctrine is designed to protect minors from “crafty adults” and 
“from their own want of sound judgment,” not merely as a safeguard for 
minors incorrectly using the technology in the process of contracting.180  The 
terms of contracts are no less dangerous when they are accepted with a click 
of a mouse rather than a signature on a hard-copy document.  In fact, as 
discussed in more detail in Part III.B below, TOS tend to be particularly 
abusive, pushing the boundaries of overreaching terms in longer, denser 
texts hidden behind a hyperlink in an obscure corner of a webpage.181 
To the extent the understanding of the technology matters, familiarity of 
the mechanisms for contracting online may actually increase the need for the 
protections of the infancy doctrine.  Minors contracting online may feel 
(falsely) empowered by their greater understanding of the tools they are 
using.  Comfort with the technology may overshadow the discomfort that 
should exist when faced with significant decisions and a representation that 
states the user has read and understood the terms (assuming the OSP has 
 
MESCH & TALMUD, supra note 174, at 12 (“Families are social systems characterized by a hierarchy 
of authority.  The computer can change this hierarchy, as the adolescent, a frequent user, becomes 
the family expert upon whom other family members rely for technical advice and guidance.”). 
 176.  See Cate, supra note 175, at 45. 
 177.  See Daniel, supra note 7, at 241; DiMatteo, supra note 91, at 485. 
 178.  43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004); see also Algeria Ford, School Liability: Holding Middle 
Schools Liable for Cyber-Bullying Despite Their Implementation of Internet Usage Contracts, 38 
J.L. & EDUC. 535, 537 (2009) (citing Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 697 A.2d 1358, 1364 (Md. 
1997)). 
 179.  43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004). 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See Ryan Patrick Murray, Comment, MySpace-ing is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of 
Service Agreements Should Not Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. 
REV. 475, 490 (2009) (“The TOS agreements of most sites are hidden behind a hyperlink at the 
bottom of a webpage and are long, unorganized, and written in incomprehensible legalese.”). 
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included that much of a warning).  Although adults may be confounded by 
the unintelligible legalese, they have some experience with which to process 
a TOS.  Youth are less likely to have been exposed to words and phrases 
such as “indemnification,” “hold harmless,” “arbitration,” “waived 
warranties,” and so forth.182  Adept hacking skills do not prepare one for the 
implications of legal liability. 
Whatever the merits of redesigning the infancy doctrine, the online 
context seems to be a particularly inappropriate place to abandon the 
doctrine, notwithstanding the technological immersion of digital youth.  I 
pursue this theme further in Part III, where I review the kinds of specific 
consumer protection issues raised with TOS and the status of the larger 
debate about their enforceability. 
III.  BOTTLENECKED IN THE TOS BLACK BOX 
The focus of this article is the application of the infancy doctrine to 
contracting online.  This part reviews what about online contracts may raise 
different issues than contracts in the real world and how those differences 
should influence the application of the infancy doctrine.  TOS create greater 
challenges for traditional contract law in three ways.  First, the process of 
manifesting assent is frequently blurred or nonexistent.  Second, notice of 
the contractual terms is weak and any assent is unknowing.  And third, the 
temptation to include every possible waiver of consumer rights and every 
possible grant of power in favor of the drafting party overcomes restraint 
when virtually unlimited text space is crammed behind a tiny hyperlink or 
diffused over multiple webpages.  The contents of such text space cannot be 
hefted, let alone seen, in their entirety at any one time. 
The obligations minors undertake in entering online contracts are 
typically twofold: they commit to pay a price for goods and services, and 
they agree to be bound by a variety of legal terms.  With respect to the first 
risk—price—online markets are less prone to take advantage of minors than 
the bargaining situations confronting minors in the prior centuries when the 
doctrine was being solidified.  The kind of haggling about price and hard 
bargaining common at car lots and craft fairs is uncommon online.  Because 
there is no visual contact, the OSP may be less aware of the particular 
vulnerabilities of individual customers than in the real world.  On the other 
hand, some OSPs expressly target minors, and most large scale services 
collect enough data on their marketing objectives and successes to 
understand when the demographics point to large numbers of minors.  In 
addition, ongoing services frequently require opening an account and 
supplying a birth date, so OSPs have clear data on the ages of their users.  
 
 182.  See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004). 
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Through cookies, OSPs could link each customer account with a version of 
the webpage tailored to play to customer interests and vulnerabilities.  
Notwithstanding access to this information and technology, pricing online 
seems to be uniform and, for this article, I will assume that the prices minors 
pay online present no unique problems. 
The more difficult question with online contracting is the legal terms to 
which users become bound in many TOS.  Like many adults, minors may be 
totally unaware that simply opening and using a free program may form a 
browsewrap contract.  A click on “I accept” means no more to minors than 
to adults.  Minors may be prepared to understand and compare prices, but 
minors as a class are less likely to understand, let alone fairly evaluate and 
compare, the legalese included in TOS. 
It is not my purpose to review all of the arguments on the merits of 
TOS, pro or con.  Rather, for purposes of this paper, I briefly situate the 
infancy doctrine in the context of the critiques of online contracting.  Part 
III.A starts with the larger trends in contract law, both on and offline, 
favoring powerful repeat players by loosening assent requirements and 
forsaking unconscionability.  Part III.B then looks specifically at the contract 
enforcement issues raised by TOS as to adults and compares the risks when 
minors are involved.  Part III.C briefly surveys the reach of common TOS 
provisions.  This part concludes that terms imposed by TOS tend to be 
lengthier, less comprehensible, and more overreaching than real-world 
contracts, even though courts still seem willing to enforce them.  While the 
terms imposed on minors are no more offensive than the terms imposed on 
adults, this caldron of potential contract abuse seems an unwise place to 
begin eviscerating deeply entrenched common-law and statutory protections 
for minors. 
A.  Loosewrap Jurisprudence 
In the last decade, “real-world” or “paper” contract law has become 
noticeably more tolerant of a lack of manifestation of assent,183 adhesion 
 
 183.  See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428–30 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding 
a browsewrap agreement despite a lack of conscious assent and arguing that, if there is indication 
that consumers know terms exist and take a benefit, it makes economic sense to bind them even 
though traditional subjective and objective manifestations of assent are absent); Pollstar v. Gigmania 
Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980–82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (enforcing a browsewrap agreement even though 
the court concluded “that many visitors to the site may not be aware of the license agreement 
[because] [n]otice of the license agreement is provided by small gray text on a gray background”).  
The infamous opinion that may be the root of this tolerance is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 
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contracts,184 and terms once thought to be overreaching.185  The Supreme 
Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute186 and the Seventh Circuit in 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg187 served up influential opinions that enforced 
fine print, real-world contracts with terms that were received by the other 
party after contract formation occurred under traditional principles.  As 
discussed in more detail in Part IV.B below,188 both courts relied on the 
assumption that such contracting served economic efficiencies and reduced 
costs to users and consumers, an assumption strongly supported by some 
commentators.189  Others are cynical about this economic analysis and the 
comparative weighing of business and consumer benefits.190  Particularly in 
the context of applying contract law to technology transactions, courts have 
shown deference to the importance of supporting an emerging 
technology/digital market.191 
 
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), which is discussed at length infra in the text accompanying notes 270–75, and 
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 184.  See Deborah Zalesne, Enforcing the Contract at All (Social) Costs: The Boundary Between 
Private Contract Law and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 579, 585–86 (2005) 
(discussing the level to which contracts of adhesion have become enforceable against both 
individuals and businesses). 
 185.  See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (upholding a forum 
selection clause against complaints that the term amounted to substantive unconscionability and 
recognizing the prolific use and validity of these clauses in today’s contracts); Amy J. Schmitz, 
Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 91 (2006) (recognizing 
“courts’ current constraint” in applying the unconscionability doctrine, thus upholding powerful 
terms against claims that they are overreaching). 
 186.  499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 187.  86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 188.  See discussion of the economic benefits of form contracts infra in the text accompanying 
notes 267–69. 
 189.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 829 (2006) (arguing that there are advantages—lower 
transaction and agency costs, which lead to lower-priced goods and services—to having standard 
nonnegotiable contracts in a competitive marketplace and claiming that the majority of courts agree 
and therefore are willing to enforce contracts of adhesion). 
 190.  See Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad 
Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 717–18 (2004) 
(arguing that Judge Easterbrook erroneously applied economic analysis, believing it would help 
maintain lower product prices, when in truth his holding may actually “increase transaction costs, 
enhance hold-up or opportunistic behavior by vendors, and result in inefficiencies as well as 
distributional unfairness by systematically redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors”); see 
also Glynn Lunney, Protecting Digital Works: Copyright or Contract?, 1 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP., Spring 1999, at 1, 23 n.38 (“For ProCD to attempt such a price discrimination scheme, it 
must have some degree of monopoly in the market for telephone listings.  Given such monopoly, 
there is little reason to expect the market to constrain effectively ProCD’s attempt to impose 
improper and inefficient terms in the use agreement.”). 
 191.  Historical and current trends in contract law are more fully discussed in Preston & McCann, 
supra note 13. 
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The consumer protection movement in American jurisprudence began in 
the 1960s and hit its apex in the 1970s.192  The unconscionability doctrine 
emerged as the mechanism for policing contract overreaching early in the 
movement.193  The focus has shifted and consumer interests are now more 
freely subsumed by renewed support for powerful, repeat players.  
Currently, the unconscionability doctrine is being applied only rarely by 
increasingly conservative judges fearful of activism charges.  Further, online 
clientele are not as likely to be the same kind of sympathetic party as the 
inner-city, undereducated, single, welfare mother without transportation to 
any other retailer, who successfully avoided contract enforcement in 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., sometimes viewed as the 
foundational unconscionability case.194  Courts tend to reserve 
unconscionability relief for parties disadvantaged by age, education,195 
language, and experience.196 
Nonetheless, a few commentators believe the unconscionability doctrine 
is sufficient even to combat the abuses of TOS.197  Most commentators who 
 
 192.  Jane K. Winn & Mark Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on U.S. 
Business-To-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209, 211 (2006) (noting decrease in U.S. 
consumer protection legal activity since the 1960s and 1970s). 
 193.  Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy 
for Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 348–49 (2010) (explaining that 
unconscionability was a primary tool courts used to protect consumers from overreaching acts 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s). 
 194.  350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).  Professor Stewart Macaulay notes the use of this case as the 
core teaching vehicle for the unconscionability doctrine.  “The Williams decision quickly became a 
favorite of law review and casebook authors.  It still is.  For example, my survey of fourteen 
casebooks published since 1980 shows that nearly everyone includes it.” Stewart Macaulay, 
Address, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair 
and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 579 
(1989) (footnote omitted).  However, he continues, “[t]he opinion is largely liberal symbolism, 
blinding us to the structural changes needed to attack poverty.”  Id. at 581.  Others criticize the use 
of this case, fearing harms that may follow its reinforcement of race and class stereotypes.  Miriam 
A. Cherry, Exploring (Social) Class in the Classroom: The Case of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 
PACE L. REV. 235, 243 (2008) (citing AMY HILSMAN KASTELY, DEBORAH WAIRE POST, SHARON 
KANG HOM & NANCY OTA, CONTRACTING LAW (4th ed. 2006)). 
 195.  Marshall v. Mercury Fin. Co., 550 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (describing 
unconscionability as a remedy for the uneducated and unsophisticated, and refusing relief to a 
college educated plaintiff). 
 196.  Jennifer M. Ralph, Comment, Unconscionable Mediation Clauses: Garrett v. Hooters-
Toldeo, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 383, 396 (2005) (“[C]ases that have addressed unconscionability 
in the context of an ADR agreement have also considered factors such as the plaintiff’s ‘age, 
education, intelligence, and business acumen and experience.’” (citing Sikes v. Ganley Pontiac 
Honda, Inc., No. 82889, 2004 WL 67224, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2004))). 
 197.  See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 493–95 (2002) (recognizing Internet-specific contract 
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have noted the increasing trend for courts to enforce contracts with 
overreaching terms question the ability of existing contract doctrines to limit 
TOS abuses.198  In particular, some argue that the unconscionability doctrine 
is not being effectively applied by courts to police TOS,199 and others argue 
that unconscionability is an improper vehicle for policing overreaching 
contracts.200  Thus, although TOS formation procedures, if any, combined 
with the bevy of extreme substantive terms should be enough, the likelihood 
of equitable relief in this climate seems unpromising. 
This movement in contract law favoring powerful actors and diluting the 
protections for vulnerable parties may itself be the best argument for the 
need to retain the infancy doctrine.201  Against this background, the peculiar 
characteristics of TOS are assessed in the next subpart, both as they apply 
generally to adults and as they become heightened when minors are 
involved. 
B.  Fat TOS and the FUD They Should Invoke 
The process of entering into, and the content of, a typical TOS are 
roundly criticized by Professors Mark Lemley,202 Nancy Kim,203 and others 
 
concerns, but finding adequate recourse in traditional doctrine, particularly the doctrine of 
unconscionability). 
 198.  See, e.g., Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing 
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 472–73 (2008) (arguing that unconscionability is inadequate for the task 
and suggesting that a better solution would be requiring “knowing assent,” rather than what some 
courts are currently calling “assent” or “mutual assent,” to enforce standard form contract terms).  
See also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006); Schmitz, supra note 185. 
 199.  See, e.g., Bern, supra note 190, at 795 (arguing that the only mechanism for policing 
contracts of adhesion is through current unconscionability doctrines which are far too weak to put 
buyers on equal ground with sellers); William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over 
Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1099, 1117–18 (2004) (arguing that doctrines such as 
unconscionability are currently insufficient to properly rein in the recent and unrelenting expansion 
of rolling contract doctrine, particularly in online contracting).  The effectiveness of 
unconscionability doctrine in the TOS context is developed more fully in Preston & McCann, supra 
note 13. 
 200.  Zalesne, supra note 184, at 597.  She argues that unconscionability has the effect of 
quashing negative behavior when strictly enforced, but often “harms the very parties such doctrines 
are intended to protect . . . [w]hen courts fail to enforce contracts based on unconscionability.”  Id.  It 
follows that current unconscionability doctrine for dealing with problems, such as adhesion, should 
likely be reevaluated.  See id. 
 201.  Daniel, supra note 7, at 240, 255 (“The long-accepted rationale for the minority incapacity 
doctrine” provides “a general recognition that minors deserve protection from their online 
escapades.”). 
 202.  Lemley, supra note 11. 
 203.  Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797 (2007). 
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for their lack of notice and adhesiveness,204 even with respect to enforcement 
against adults.  The basis for these critiques depends on a careful comparison 
between the process, timing, incentives, mechanisms, and psychology of 
contracting in cyberspace as opposed to the world in which contract law and 
the infancy doctrine in particular have been formed. 
To begin with, fewer offline transactions involve significant boilerplate 
terms.  When consumers pay cash and go into a movie there may be some 
sort of contract, but it includes only those words that can fit across the 
bottom or the back of the ticket.  They can buy a handbag and walk out of 
the store protected by implied Uniform Commercial Code warranties and 
without committing to resolve any dispute with the vendor in Santa Clara 
County, California.  They can mail a letter and photographs without granting 
the postmaster a global license to the use of their creative works for any 
purpose and forever. 
Some offline transactions involve a complex set of terms similar to 
those typically found in TOS.  Although the Internet has effectively replaced 
many forms of interaction, webpages do not offer any substitute for the 
precautionary function of feeling the size of a tangible multiple-page 
document, seeing the serious format and the obvious work of well-paid 
attorneys, and devoting the time for a formal signature, let alone the 
ritualistic significance of going to the provider’s office to “execute” the 
contract.  The contract provider’s mere presence in any location creates yet 
another trigger for the consumer to recognize the significance of her actions. 
A person asked to sign a lease or license in the brick-and-mortar world 
may well balk at signing ten pages of small print and begin asking questions 
about the implications of the document.  Online, such a person cannot 
readily comprehend the enormity of the terms, and there is no one with 
whom to discuss them.  The ability to tuck in heaps of virtually invisible and 
under-scrutinized terms is a notable characteristic of cyberspace. 
Most real-world consumers will be aware they are contracting if the 
length of the terms exceeds the back of the receipt.  On the other hand, vast 
legal consequences hidden behind a hyperlink embedded in some brief 
phrase are activated with a click thought of only as a request to continue to 
the next page.  With such a clickwrap contract, if anyone sees the link and 
follows it, she may find that the next screen is also highlighted with other 
 
 204.  Criticism of the “rolling contract” concept traced to ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), may also be applied to all wrap contracts.  See, e.g., Bern, supra note 190, at 
641–710, 766–67, 795 (harshly criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s “terms later” analysis and arguing 
that allowing sellers another avenue for abusing buyers in the contracting process increases the 
power imbalance). 
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hyperlinks to other elements of the overall legal commitment.  For example, 
Professor Nancy Kim dissects the TOS for Gap.com to demonstrate that a 
user must engage in a virtual scavenger hunt just to obtain each piece of the 
TOS that the consumer is allegedly bound to by using the services.205  Other 
TOS, such as Google’s, simply refer to and incorporate into the “Universal 
Terms” any number of other collections of terms without the benefit of 
hyperlinks.206  Of course, the terms comprising a browsewrap contract are 
not even this obvious.  The consumer is not asked to click, and the contract 
can become binding without moving a curser anywhere near a link to the 
terms. 
But then, even users expressly directed to TOS will typically not 
actually read them.207  Flipping through for an overview of the terms is not 
as practical online.  An OSP might easily use available technology to make 
terms conspicuous without the additional expense associated with printing 
user-friendly forms; flashing, variegated colors and sound might be 
interesting.  Easy coding can serve to direct readers to the most significant or 
dangerous terms.  Including links to external resources for understanding the 
significance of certain kinds of terms would be simple.  But OSPs have not 
bothered with these approaches because judicial and economic pressure have 
never materialized.  The best solution for OSPs is to decrease the likelihood 
that anyone will read them. 
Consumers may suffer some increased vulnerability to fraud and 
unreliable business practices and products online, and such problems may be 
more difficult for consumers to resolve.208  Established merchants in the 
brick-and-mortar neighborhood have likely been vetted by people the 
consumer knows and trusts, and such businesses must have demonstrated 
some reliability to support their longevity.  On the other hand, a webpage 
 
 205.  Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 
1358 (2011) (analyzing the Gap browsewrap agreement which notes, “Your submission of personal 
information through the Sites is governed by our privacy policy, which can be reached by clicking 
on the ‘Privacy Policy’ link located in the footer section of the Sites. . . .  This Agreement 
incorporates by reference the terms and conditions of the Privacy Policy.”); see also Juliet M. 
Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1331 (2005) 
(asking whether “an Internet user [should] be required to click through a series of pages to find the 
contract terms to which she is agreeing”). 
 206.  Google TOS, supra note 170, ¶ 1.4. 
 207.  Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract?  Lessons Learned 
and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 7, 24 
(2009) (noting the general acceptance that consumers typically do not read online contracts); Robert 
A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms 
Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840–41 (2006) (recognizing that Internet users do not usually 
read terms, let alone understand them or the potential risks attached to them). 
 208.  See Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 743 (2005); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 197, at 468. 
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may look like an established business even though it is in its first day of 
operation. 
Customers of physical businesses can identify the people who own the 
business or those who work there if the principals are not apparent.  Local 
owners and employees may have more incentive to avoid creating unhappy 
customers who are going to appear in person, raise their voices, and create 
an uncomfortable scene.  Moreover, legal disputes that arise are more 
cheaply and easily solved by the consumer.  The real-world product or 
service provider is less likely to attach significant fine print to ordinary 
transactions.  Without a forum selection clause, a dispute with such a 
provider may be resolvable in a local court.  Without a sweeping waiver of 
responsibility or liability, a consumer at least retains a cause of action to 
pursue. 
Of course, many eStores and services have what digital natives may 
think of as eons of longevity and may be used regularly by all of one’s 
acquaintances.  Minors are accustomed to relying on others to check for their 
safety.  In fact, minors may perceive that they are so restricted from what 
adults think is dangerous—such as buying alcohol, entering a casino, or 
holding a credit card—that anything they are permitted to do without a fuss 
must be eminently safe.  Minors may also rely heavily on the crowd;209 one 
may think that, because everyone is doing it, someone must have figured out 
the fine print and decided it was not a problem—if a minor is aware of fine 
print at all. 
In addition to the lack of signals warning that practically invisible, 
extraordinarily lengthy and complex terms lurk online, digital transactions 
feed on impulsiveness and exaggerate weaknesses in judgment and 
inaccurate assessments of risk.210  A product or service may be located with 
a browser, selected by the buyer/user based on a digital image, and 
purchased through an electronic shopping cart using a secure socket layer to 
transmit virtual cash—all within seconds.  Professor Susan Gindin’s analysis 
of the Sears privacy disclosure case describes studies showing that the 
nature of the Internet forum and the dramatically increased number of 
contracts entered per online consumer makes these consumers “unlikely to 
consider the legal consequences of [their] online behavior.”211 
 
 209.  For a discussion of this phenomenon, see MURRAY KRANTZ, CHILD DEVELOPMENT: RISK 
AND OPPORTUNITY 510 (1994). 
 210.  See Preston & McCann, supra note 13 (addressing why people are more impulsive online 
and the cautionary issues involved with online contracting). 
 211.  Gindin, supra note 207, at 7. 
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The psychological dynamics of entering fast and easy contracts online 
are reviewed with compelling insights by Professor Juliet Moringiello.212  
Moringiello specifically notes the significance of having a person present in 
the face-to-face contracting as both a source of information and a prompt for 
the other party to recognize the legal implications of the decision.213  
Additionally, Moringiello argues that taking the time to apply a physical 
signature to a document rather than quickly clicking through a page has 
some psychological effect, as “we are conditioned to think that we are doing 
something important.”214  Digital purchasers need not form even the 
forethought necessary to get dressed, move from a comfortable chair, and 
drive themselves to a store during business hours.  Online, the stores are at 
one’s fingertips twenty-four hours a day. 
Adults regularly succumb.  But the power of instant gratification to 
overcome judgment is magnified by the nature of minors.  Recent 
neuroscience research suggests that minors’ brains are structurally immature 
and that the pre-frontal cortex, responsible for impulse control, is one of the 
last areas of the brain to mature,215 and so minors’ ability to “exhibit adult 
levels of judgment and control” are generally limited.216  When mixed with 
one-click satisfaction, minors’ tendency toward impulsiveness and risk 
taking becomes toxic. 
Of course, if the provisions of TOS were balanced and reasonable, the 
process of, and motivations for, entering into them become relatively 
insignificant.  In the next subpart, I briefly survey the kinds of terms 
common in TOS. 
 
 212.  Moringiello, supra note 205, at 1347. 
 213.  Id. at 1315. 
 214.  Id. at 1316. 
 215.  Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n & the Am. Acad. of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 13, 23, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 
08-7412), 2009 WL 2247127 [hereinafter AMA Brief].  Id. at 18, 25–26 (“[A]dolescents experience 
increasing motivation for risky and reward-seeking behavior without a corresponding increase in the 
ability to self-regulate behavior.” (citing Amy L. Krain et al., An fMRI Examination of 
Developmental Differences in the Neural Correlates of Uncertainty and Decision-Making, 47 J. 
CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1023 (2006))).  For more discussion of the recent medical studies 
and how they inform minors’ capacity to contract, see Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, 
Legal Osmosis: Allowing Science to Inform Law’s Conceptions of Childhood (forthcoming); see also 
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
1009, 1013 (2003) (citing Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral 
Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 417 (2000)). 
 216.  AMA Brief, supra note 215, at 4. 
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C.  Standard Protocol TOS 
Several writers have expounded on various TOS that could be 
considered overreaching with respect to adults, standing alone or in 
conjunction with other factors,217 including me.218  A thorough cataloguing is 
unnecessary, but awareness of typical terms that would likely bewilder a 
minor (if read) or implicate important interests of minors is useful for 
weighing the infancy doctrine’s viability online. 
Although minors may have some understanding of the jury system, they 
seem ill-suited to weighing the disadvantages of abandoning the 
constitutional right to a jury, with or without arbitration.  Rather than an 
arbitration clause, the MySpace TOS provides: “Each of the parties hereby 
knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waives any right it may have to a 
trial by jury in respect of any litigation (including, but not limited to, any 
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third party claims) arising out of, 
under or in connection with this agreement.”219 
Fewer TOS now contain mandatory arbitration clauses following Specht 
v. Netscape Communications Corp.,220 McKee v. AT & T Corp.,221 and Bragg 
v. Linden Research, Inc.,222 though some still do.223  Further, such clauses are 
likely to have renewed popularity following the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,224 broadening the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses.  Notwithstanding many staunch 
supporters, a commitment to mandatory arbitration ought not be taken 
 
 217.  See, e.g., Gindin, supra note 207, at 35–36 (providing cases that have held clauses in online 
contracts unconscionable); Murray, supra note 181, at 489–90 (2009) (applying tests from NEC 
Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 771–72 (Ga. 1996), and finding TOS agreements 
“procedurally and substantively unconscionable”). 
 218.  See Preston & McCann, supra note 13. 
 219.  MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, ¶ 16 (June 25, 2009), 
http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms [hereinafter MySpace TOS]. 
 220.  306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (identifying the degree to which users should reasonably have 
been aware of the arbitration clause in a technology contract). 
 221.  191 P.3d 845 (Wash. 2008) (finding a TOS with an arbitration clause was a contract of 
adhesion, unconscionable, and overly harsh). 
 222.  487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding arbitration clause unenforceable under 
California unconscionability law). 
 223.  Professor Schmitz studied “wireless phone service contracts from the nine major providers 
with a presence in Colorado.  All of the companies required arbitration of consumer claims.”  Amy J. 
Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 147 (2010).  She also reports on a study finding that “[75%] of the [end-
user license agreements] studied had choice of law clauses, 28% had choice of forum clauses, and 
only 6% had arbitration clauses.”  Id. at 137–38. 
 224.  130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
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lightly.  Professor Amy Schmitz has published extensively on arbitration 
clauses.225  She documents that “overly burdensome” arbitration clauses are 
rampant, especially online.226 
TOS typically include a number of other material terms once considered 
overreaching and unenforceable, such as a mandatory choice of venue.  
These are now joined by terms that reach even further.  Professor David 
Horton describes various types of unilateral modification clauses common in 
TOS, and the varying degrees of obligations the OSP retains in informing 
the consumer of changes.227  The TOS for MySpace,228 Twitter,229 and 
Amazon230 give the OSPs the power to unilaterally modify the user 
agreement.  MySpace does not even agree to provide the user with 
notification of any changes, instead stating that it is the user’s obligation to 
read the TOS regularly to make sure she still agrees to all the terms.231  Even 
if real assent were required to enter a TOS, it is difficult to argue that a user 
knowingly conferred on the other contractual party a carte blanche to make 
and remake any contract it likes.  The use of unilateral modification clauses 
“widens the informational gulf between drafters and adherents [and] 
increases the burden on the judicial system.”232  Yet courts are upholding 
such clauses.233  Expecting a minor to regularly check for significant 
changes in his or her contractual risks is even less realistic than assuming he 
or she will feed the dog twice a day without reminders. 
Some OSPs in their TOS claim to own the rights to all material posted 
or submitted to their sites for any purpose, including the right to copy, 
sublicense, and distribute that material.  For instance, “you grant us a non-
exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use 
 
 225.  Schmitz, supra note 223, at 168–69. 
 226.  Id. at 116 (“Companies increasingly include arbitration clauses among the ‘modular’ terms 
cobbled into boilerplate contracts. . . . Commentators and policymakers worry that pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses rob consumers of their judicial recourse rights without knowing consent and 
unfairly advantage corporate ‘repeat players’ who routinely include arbitration clauses in their form 
consumer contracts.”). 
 227.  David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 605, 623–53, 661–62 (2010). 
 228.  MySpace TOS, supra note 219, at Introductory para. 3. 
 229.  Terms of Service, TWITTER, para. 16 (June 11, 2011), http://twitter.com/tos. 
 230.  Terms of Use, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, para. 13, http://aws.amazon.com/terms (last 
updated Feb. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Amazon TOS]. 
 231.  MySpace TOS, supra note 219, at Introductory para. 3. 
 232.  Horton, supra note 227, at 605. 
 233.  Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding a unilateral 
modification clause because the party with the power to modify was limited in the agreement to only 
modify “non-material” terms); Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, No. 2:07-CV-916, 2008 WL 
2465450, at *7 (D. Utah June 16, 2008) (upholding a unilateral modification clause because the 
consumer could have easily viewed the agreement online and noticed updates); Bank One, N.A. v. 
Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 836 (S.D. Miss. 2001), aff’d, 34 F. App’x 964 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding an arbitration clause that was unilaterally added). 
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any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook.”234  
Professor Cromer Young and others have addressed the harrowing notion 
that sites could exercise such a clause to limit a minor’s use of her own 
creative work at a future time.235  For example, children on Disney’s Club 
Penguin site are “encouraged to author articles, jokes, poems, and other 
works,” and then grant Disney an irrevocable license to the intellectual 
property rights according to the TOS.236  While not all material posted on 
Facebook or sent by e-mail is worthy of Shakespeare or Picasso, many 
minors are exceptionally creative and the Internet has opened possibilities 
for marketing intellectual property previously unavailable to budding artists 
and poets in prior generations. 
Moreover, minors may be less cautious than adults in posting pictures of 
themselves and their friends online.  The image of a young girl taken by her 
church counselor and posted on Yahoo!’s Flickr appeared on bus shelters all 
over major metropolitan centers in Australia, with captions such as “FREE 
VIRGIN TO VIRGIN TEXTING,” as part of Virgin Australia’s ad 
campaign for mobile phone services.237  Even if such use was not offensive 
to the pictured minor, large-scale commercial use without compensation is 
surely not contemplated by minors who post photos online.  The notion that 
minors knowingly grant what appears to be an exclusive license for 
exploitation of their content seems absurd. 
Finally, consider the two TOS presented in the iParadigms case.238  
Although the minors in the case were found to have accepted the User 
Agreement by clicking,239 Turnitin also had another set of terms titled 
“Usage Policy” that purported to become binding when the site was used, 
even without the submission of a paper.  The first paragraph of this Usage 
Policy warned: “IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS, PROMPTLY EXIT THIS SITE.”240  Apparently, continuing 
on the site for the purpose of reading the terms of the Usage Policy makes 
reading them irrelevant, as acceptance has already occurred. 
 
 234.  Facebook TOS, supra note 169, ¶ 2.1. 
 235.  Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 444–47; Heather Hruby, Comment, That’s Show Business 
Kid: An Overview of Contract Law in the Entertainment Industry, 27 J. JUV. L. 47 (2006). 
 236.  Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 446 (footnotes omitted). 
 237.  Chang ex. rel. Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-1767-D, 2009 WL 111570, 
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009). 
 238.  A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478–79 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 239.  Id. at 480. 
 240.  Usage Policy, TURNITIN, https://turnitin.com/static/aboutus/usage.php (last visited Oct. 28, 
2011). 
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Although the district court in iParadigms did not apply the browsewrap 
Usage Policy, it did enforce the User Agreement, which the court 
characterizes as the Clickwrap Agreement.241  The district court drew the 
line at the browsewrap Usage Policy242 because of two problems: (1) the 
Clickwrap Agreement stated that it was the sole agreement for users, thereby 
contradicting the existence of the additional Usage Policy, and (2) the 
minors never gave knowing and meaningful assent to the Usage Policy 
because they did not know it existed and were not required to see it or even 
given a link to it.243  The existence of multiple sets of terms, as was the case 
here, itself identifies another kind of risk not common in hard copy 
contracts, but prevalent online. 
But the Clickwrap Agreement in iParadigms was bad enough on its 
own.  It contained a sweeping waiver of liability.244  The waiver purports to 
waive everything, including intentional torts and strict liability statutory 
claims.245  Moreover, even if the cause of action survives, the waiver cancels 
every possible kind of damages.246  The court interpreted the waiver to 
counter the minors’ claims, although the examples following the first 
italicized phrase below are centered around claims caused by the OSP’s 
misfeasance: 
In no event shall iParadigms, LLC and/or its suppliers be liable for 
any direct, indirect, punitive, incidental, special, or consequential 
damages arising out of or in any way connected with the use of this 
web site or with the delay or inability to use this web site, or for any 
information, software, products, and services obtained through this 
web site, or otherwise arising out of the use of this web site, whether 
based in contract, tort, strict liability or otherwise, even if 
iParadigms, inc. or any of its suppliers has been advised of the 
possibility of damages. 247 
 
 241.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
 242.  Id. at 479. 
 243.  Id. at 484–85. 
 244.  Id. at 478. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id.  The waiver in the iParadigms’ TOS might have been challenged on unconscionability 
grounds.  It purports to waive liability for every action or inaction and does not exclude from its 
range intentional or recklessly negligent torts of its own employees.  Not all courts look kindly on a 
blanket waiver of any responsibility to the other party to the contract.  See, e.g., Anderson & 
Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709, 712 (Idaho 1979) (“[It is] well established that 
courts look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability [blanket waiver of liability provisions] 
and construe such provisions strictly against the person relying on them, especially when that person 
is the preparer of the document.” (citing Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seabord Sur. Co., 318 P.2d 84 (Cal. 
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The minors’ written disclaimers on the copy of their submitted works 
indicated they did not consent to the archiving of their works by Turnitin.248  
In a brick-and-mortar context, this act would create a counteroffer.  
Understandably, OSPs must rely on computer interface and the program 
does not screen for deviations in acceptance and counteroffer, although it 
could theoretically be coded to do that.  The fact that demonstrations of 
intent cognizable in the real world are ignored online may be another reason 
to subject them to stricter scrutiny. 
The infancy doctrine may be archaic.  Some courts and commentators 
seem leery of the doctrine, but abandonment at this point in time, in which 
the legal environment is unsupportive of consumers generally and without 
other robust policing mechanisms, may not be optimal.  Moreover, 
cyberspace is not the place to foreground an erosion of the doctrine, if 
indeed that is the right choice.  The juxtaposition of the particular risks 
involving TOS and the particular tendencies of most youth suggest TOS 
present an inappropriate context for experimenting with removing traditional 
protections for minors. 
IV.  PHISHING FOR MINORS’ BUSINESS 
Professor Daniel argues that the continued application of the infancy 
doctrine would be devastating in digital markets, and so concludes the 
doctrine should be abandoned.249  I propose that the economic implications 
would be significant, but not disastrous.  In Part IV.A, I discuss how minors 
make purchases online and the extent to which these mechanisms of 
payment provide any protection to vendors.  But, as mentioned above, 
businesses’ right to payment is only one part of the transaction; the right to 
rely on the TOS provisions is also threatened by the infancy doctrine.  In 
Part IV.B, I discuss how online businesses, even those offering “free” 
services, may have an economic stake in the enforceability of TOS, whether 
or not the social value of such economic benefits are, or should be, 
outweighed by consumer interests.  Reliance on TOS to form a substantial 
part of the economic bargain is particularly unwise when attempting to 
impose TOS on minors. 
In Part IV.C, I discuss how the risks of disaffirmance can be managed if 
OSPs make reasonable changes to their practices.  Of course, these changes 
 
Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Talley v. Skelly Oil Co., 433 P.2d 425 (Kan. 1967); Walker Bank & Trust Co. 
v. First Sec. Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959))). 
 248.  iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
 249.  Daniel, supra note 7, at 255. 
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may not be sufficient if use of the infancy doctrine balloons extraordinarily.  
In such an event, the infancy doctrine, and the policies supporting it, may 
need a major reassessment.  In the meantime, a refresher on the policies 
behind the infancy doctrine may lead to substantial improvements in markets 
aimed at minors. 
A.  Caching in on Minors 
Teenagers’ buying power in 2006 was $79.7 billion and is expected to 
increase to $91.1 billion in 2011 despite an estimated 3% decline in the 
teenage population during that time.250  According to a 2010 Pew Research 
Center Internet study, the 48% of wired teens who now purchase online is a 
significant increase from the “31% who had done so in 2000.”251  With this 
trend towards increased participation in the online marketplace, minors have 
the potential to cause serious economic consequences to online businesses 
by disaffirming contracts in droves. 
Minors have access to money, and they spend it.  Teens have always had 
a high rate of summer employment, with fifty-one percent employed in June 
2000, although teen employment is down during the current recession.252  
Family allowance programs, gifts, and “as needed” money from parents and 
other relatives also contribute to disposable teen income.253  According to a 
2006 study, teens had eighty billion dollars in yearly income from 
allowances, work around the house, or employment.254  These teenagers 
were estimated to control $4,500 in discretionary spending,255 with “boys 
under 18 hav[ing] an average of $525 to spend each month, while girls have 
$430.”256 
 
 250.  Teen Market to Surpass $200 Billion by 2011, Despite Population Decline, MARKETING 
CHARTS (June 28, 2007), http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/teen-market-to-surpass-200-
billion-by-2011-despite-population-decline-817 [hereinafter Teen Market]; see also DEBRA AHO 
WILLIAMSON, EMARKETER, TWEENS AND TEENS ONLINE: FROM MARIO TO MYSPACE 4 (Oct. 2006), 
available at http://www.emarketer.com/Reports/All/Em_tweens_oct06.aspx (revealing that in 2005, 
children ages three to eleven commanded $18.3 billion in spending power, which was projected to 
increase to $21.4 billion in 2010). 
 251.  LENHART ET AL., supra note 8, at 4. 
 252.  Stephanie Pappas, Soaring Teen Unemployment Could Have Lifetime Effects, LIVE SCIENCE 
(Aug. 22, 2010), http://www.livescience.com/health/recession-impacting-teenage-employment-
opportunities.html. 
 253.  Teen Market, supra note 250; M. J. Alhabeeb, Teenagers’ Money, Discretionary Spending 
and Saving, 7 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 123, 124 (1996) (“Teens have three major sources of 
income: family allowances, earnings from part-time employment, and gifts and other funds received 
from parents and relatives.”). 
 254.  BROWN & WASHTON, supra note 9, at 3. 
 255.  MEDIAMARK RESEARCH INC., supra note 6, at 4. 
 256.  Renee M. Covino, Cracking the Kid/Candy Code, ALLBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 1, 2007), 
http://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-advertising/market-groups-youth-market-teens/5500615-
DO NOT DELETE 2/13/2012  2:03 PM 
[Vol. 39: 225, 2012] CyberInfants 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
269 
Businesses rely on minors.  If minors disaffirm, in most states they can 
demand back any amounts paid to the adult, subject only to the obligation to 
return whatever physical consideration is still in the minor’s possession, if 
any.  Thus, as it currently stands, the infancy doctrine could lead to 
significant direct economic losses in the inability to collect monies 
committed by contract or, alternatively, from an obligation to refund 
consideration paid by a minor. 
Vendors online may find a certain solace in believing a parent is 
secondarily liable for online charges made by minors.  However, assuming 
that every credit card charge means a parent has assumed liability to pay the 
money (let alone be bound to the TOS) is a mistake.  It is true that minors 
frequently do make online charges using a parent’s credit card, and most of 
the time, the parent’s credit card company would be liable for the money 
part of the transaction at least, but not always.  Assuming the minor has 
actual authority to use the card, the adult owner of the card becomes liable to 
pay, even if the minor does not.  If the minor does not have authority, then 
the card is treated as stolen, and the other party to the disaffirmed contract 
must return the money paid by the minor and cannot look to the card owner 
or to the card company that will likely charge back any credit given on that 
sale.257  In any event, if the minor disaffirms, the vendor could demand 
payment from the adult or the adult’s credit card company.258  But the 
agreement with the card issuer does not bind the parent owner of the credit 
card to comply with the OSPs’ TOS. 
Minors have ways to pay without using a parent’s credit card.  A minor 
may, in limited cases, own a regular credit card issued before the Credit 
Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 became 
effective.259  The Act now prohibits issuing credit cards to anyone under age 
 
1.html.  Of these teenagers, about twenty-six percent had placed an Internet order in the year before 
the survey.  BROWN & WASHTON, supra note 9, at 211. 
 257.  See Fifth Third Bank v. Gilbert, 478 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1984); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643(d) (2010) (“[Subject to a few exceptions], a cardholder incurs no liability from the 
unauthorized use of a credit card.”). 
 258.  Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Credit Cards—Authorized and Unauthorized Use, 13 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 233, 238 (1994) (detailing the various parties and contracts involved in a credit card 
transaction and citing JEFFREY B. REITMAN ET AL., 10 BANKING LAW § 259.02[1]–[3] (1989)). 
 259.  Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 
123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  Certain provisions of the 
Act became effective on February 22, 2010.  Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/20100112a.htm. 
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twenty-one,260 unless signed by an adult willing to be jointly liable for any 
debts,261 or supported by evidence of “independent means of repaying any 
obligation.”262  Under the Act, an unemancipated minor may be able to 
establish independent funds and obtain a card.  Although allowing such a 
minor out of a transaction may push the boundaries of the infancy doctrine 
policies, there is no established exception applicable. 
Teens typically deposit the money they control into a bank account and 
direct debits from such accounts are permitted by many OSPs.  If a 
transaction is later voided and the amount paid by the minor refunded, the 
adult who takes a debit drawn on such account does not have a claim against 
the bank.263  The bank does not secondarily guarantee payment.  Minors can 
also use cash to purchase prepaid credit cards, and may be the recipients of 
prepaid gift cards.264  But, as discussed above, the loss of expected payment 
is only one half of the consequences of disaffirmance. 
B.  A Glitch in Processing TOS 
Clearly an online business would be hurt if an obligation to pay were not 
enforceable, but economic losses may arise in other ways.  In addition, many 
of the most popular online service sites are “free.”  Outside of the 
expectation of payment, OSPs may suffer a cost in being stripped of an 
enforceable TOS although measurement of that cost is more subtle.  Even if 
an OSP does not require direct payment, economic benefits are what induce 
an OSP to provide a free service (and keep their shareholders from suing the 
board of directors for giving away corporate resources).  These benefits 
include advertising revenue, brand recognition, increased likelihood that 
users of free services will also purchase revenue generating services, and so 
forth.  If the OSPs may be subject to disputes without any protection from a 
TOS, the cost of providing non-chargeable services may outweigh these 
benefits. 
For instance, the economic viability of Turnitin, the “free” plagiarism 
detection program in iParadigms, is dependent on retaining a database of 
 
 260.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c)(8)(A) (West 2010) (“No credit card may be issued to, or open end 
consumer credit plan established by or on behalf of, a consumer who has not attained the age of 
21 . . . .”). 
 261.  Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(i). 
 262.  Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii). 
 263.  The bank acts only as an agent in honoring the drawer’s order to pay.  See U.C.C. § 3-414 
(2002).  Only the owner of the account who signs or directs payment is liable on the underlying 
transaction unless the payment is a certified or cashier’s check signed by the bank.  See U.C.C. § 3-
401(a) (2006). 
 264.  These kinds of cards are defined and regulated in the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, as 
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693l(-1) (West 2009). 
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prior submissions against which to check future submissions.265  The TOS 
includes a waiver that arguably protects it from a lawsuit for copyright 
infringement liability for this practice.266  Although both the district court 
and the Fourth Circuit were able to construct a fair use exception protecting 
iParadigms from copyright infringement claims without ultimately relying 
on the waiver, in another case, the fair use exception may not be available.  
An OSP could avoid the normative pitfalls of TOS and provide a clear and 
obvious provision permitting the exchange of data for the use of the service.  
The availability of such programs is unquestionably linked to the ability to 
make some bargains with users.  The right of minors to disaffirm puts these 
benefits at risk. 
Putting aside for the moment the disputes about the application of 
economic theory and the reality of eventual consumer benefits, a matter on 
which I do not intend to comment, obviously economic consequences attach 
to TOS terms.  Some consequences may benefit only the bottom line of the 
OSP, but having some bottom line is essential to staying in business. 
According to Judge Easterbrook, “Terms and conditions offered by 
contract reflect private ordering, essential to the efficient functioning of 
markets.”267  Maureen O’Rourke agrees: “[T]erms of use are no less a part of 
‘the product’ than are the size of the database and the speed with which the 
software [works].”268  Further, “[t]his method of contracting facilitates a 
mass market that might otherwise not exist by saving the transaction costs of 
face-to-face bargaining.  The particular terms help the OSP recoup its 
investment while not forcing it to charge an exorbitant price.”269 
An example of a TOS that validly decreases the cost of doing business is 
a reasonable limitation on the license to use software.  What if Matthew 
Zeidenberg had been seventeen at the time he purchased and uploaded 
software from ProCD?  The district court in that case found that the database 
provided by ProCD was not protected under the Copyright Act or the 
Computer Crimes Act, and that all the state claims were preempted by 
 
 265.  A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477–78 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 266.  Id. at 478. 
 267.  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting in part Am. 
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995)). 
 268.  Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based 
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 69 (1997) (quoting ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453). 
 269.  Id. at 68. 
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federal law.270  This conclusion was assumed to be true on appeal to the 
Seventh Circuit.271  Thus, the courts proceeded on the assumption that, in the 
absence of an enforceable contract, nothing prevented Zeidenberg, or anyone 
else, from purchasing access to the ProCD database at the private consumer 
price and then using it for commercial purposes. 
The district court refused to enforce the contract, concluding that 
“because defendants did not have the opportunity to bargain or object to the 
proposed user agreement or even review it before purchase and they did not 
assent to the terms explicitly after they learned of them, they are not bound 
by the user agreement.”272  On appeal, all of Judge Easterbrook’s efforts to 
find an enforceable contract would have been for naught if Zeidenberg could 
then simply disaffirm the contract using the infancy doctrine.273  
Applicability of the TOS was economically significant in that case even 
though Zeidenberg had paid the purchase price and was not asking for a 
refund. 
In addition, according to Judge Easterbrook’s explanation of price 
discrimination against commercial users and arbitrage, if all restrictions in 
license agreements were unenforceable, databases such as those compiled by 
ProCD, which “cost more than $10 million to compile and [was] expensive 
to keep current,” would become prohibitively expensive for consumers and 
most commercial clients.274  As Judge Easterbrook notes, “To the extent 
 
 270.  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 
(7th Cir. 1996).  The court also held that: 
(1) users did not infringe copyrighted software by downloading it onto their computer’s 
hard drive for purposes of making uncopyrightable listings available on Internet; (2) users 
were not bound by “shrinkwrap license” included with the software; (3) state law breach 
of contract and misappropriation claims were preempted by Copyright Act; and (4) 
Computer Crimes Act claim, as to users’ conduct, was preempted. 
Id. at 640. 
 271.  ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.  However, this assumption is in some respects wrong.  See Nancy S. 
Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103 (explaining that, although it was 
uncertain that intellectual property law protected software, the underlying code or program is subject 
to copyright protection and, if a patent has been filed for the code, to patent law protection). 
 272.  ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655. 
 273.  As to the preemption findings of the district court, Judge Easterbrook concludes by stating 
that promises to pay for intellectual property can be enforced even though federal law “offers no 
protection against third-party uses of that property.”  ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.  Nothing in the 
opinion addresses whether any other possible remedy exists without an enforceable contract. 
 274.  Id. at 1449. 
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single price . . .  it 
would have to raise the price . . . . [and consumers] would cease to buy if the price rose 
substantially.  If because of high elasticity of demand in the consumer segment of the 
market the only way to make a profit turned out to be a price attractive to commercial 
users alone, then all consumers would lose out—and so would the commercial clients, 
who would have to pay more for the listings because ProCD could not obtain any 
contribution toward costs from the consumer market. 
Id. 
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licenses facilitate distribution of object code while concealing the source 
code (the point of a clause forbidding disassembly), they serve the same 
procompetitive functions as does the law of trade secrets.”275  These 
procompetitive benefits depend on an enforceable TOS.276 
Another example of a provision that makes doing business cheaper, 
although it may not always be fair when hidden deep in an incomprehensible 
TOS, is a forum selection clause.277  The Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute noted that a contract with a forum selection clause allows 
a business with national reach to avoid “litigation in several different fora,” 
and “dispel[s] any confusion about where suits . . . must be brought . . . 
sparing litigants . . . time and expense.”278  The Supreme Court then 
referenced the Seventh Circuit’s language in Northwestern National 
Insurance Co. v. Donovan, which notes the “huge convenience to [a 
business] to be able to defend these suits in home territory.”279  In addition, 
in the absence of a statute, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable by a party that 
prevails in a dispute unless a contract term provides for fees,280 and, of 
course, lawyers everywhere support such provisions. 
Other provisions that may lower the cost of doing business are those that 
identify as governing law a state with law familiar or favorable to the OSP, 
proscribe rules for filing complaints, shorten statutes of limitations, and so 
forth.  The normative value to society in permitting mega-conglomerate 
power-holders to impose such terms on consumers may be questionable.  
But the economic value to those who have enough power to impose them is 
clear. 
 
 275.  Id. at 1455. 
 276.  See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
shrinkwrap agreement that prohibited viewing source code for reverse engineering, even though 
reverse engineering is a fair use). 
 277.  The MySpace TOS, for example, contains a term acknowledging that the licensee waives all 
rights to trial by jury for any litigation resulting from the use of its services and further restricts all 
conflict resolution to the jurisdiction of New York.  MySpace TOS, supra note 219, ¶ 16.  eBay 
explains that by accepting its TOS, the licensee agrees to resolve any dispute either in “the courts 
located within Santa Clara County” or through arbitration if the claim is under $10,000.  Your User 
Agreement, EBAY, para. 17 (“Legal Disputes”), http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). The Amazon TOS contains a term subjecting the 
licensee to personal jurisdiction in the state of Washington and demanding that all disputes will be 
settled within Washington courts.  Amazon TOS, supra note 230, para. 12 (“Disputes”). 
 278.  499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991). 
 279.  916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 280.  1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 6:1 (3d ed. 2010) (“The ‘American Rule,’ which 
has been consistently applied throughout the United States, is that a litigant is ordinarily not entitled 
to collect attorneys’ fees from the opposing party in the absence of a statute or court rule or a 
contractual provision.”). 
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In summary, the infancy doctrine allows a minor to walk away from 
unreasonable contract obligations and from contract obligations that may 
have been reasonable if imposed on an adult—and to obtain restitution of 
any consideration she has already paid, subject to an offset in a minority of 
jurisdictions.281  The right to assert this doctrine, in all of its breadth, is 
bounded by limited established defenses.282  It is no surprise that, with 
increased use, the infancy doctrine would ultimately discourage online 
businesses from contracting with minors.  But then, this disincentive is, 
precisely, one of the stated purposes of the doctrine.283  In the next subpart, I 
suggest how online businesses should respond to the threat of the infancy 
doctrine. 
C.  Defragmenting a Volatile Situation 
In this article, I acknowledge that the infancy doctrine may be in need of 
reassessment, but that reassessment must be thoughtful and new standards 
should be carefully tailored to the merits and abuses of modern markets and 
the capacities of minors.  In addition, I recommend that such reassessment 
take place in conventional contract forums before being attempted with 
respect to TOS.  However, until that reassessment happens, online 
businesses can, and must, respond appropriately to the doctrine, as it is now 
the law.  I offer some common sense suggestions for dealing with a teen 
market. 
Of course, we can all imagine how the infancy doctrine may be abused.  
Most, if not all, of the general categories of abuse are not new, and have 
been contemplated by courts and legislatures considering the doctrine over 
the last century.284  In addition, of course, courts may police actions that rise 
to the level of bad faith.285  One aspect of current technological markets not 
previously included in the calculation of the infancy doctrine may be the 
need for limited software licenses.  And, perhaps, further limitations should 
target a minor’s premeditated and repeated use of the doctrine.  Research on 
the frequency of youth taking advantage of uninformed casual sellers and 
small businesses is warranted, even if the conduct is not what would 
traditionally be identified as bad faith.  Elsewhere, I offer suggestions for 
additional exceptions to, and some amelioration of, the burdens of enforcing 
the infancy doctrine.286 
 
 281.  See supra text accompanying notes 94–102. 
 282.  See supra Part II.B–D. 
 283.  43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004) (“It is the policy of the law to . . . discourage adults from 
contracting with an infant.”). 
 284.  Id. (citing cases as early as 1920). 
 285.  See supra Part II.A. 
 286.  See Preston & Crowther, supra note 15. 
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But the values that underlie the infancy doctrine are powerful.  The 
infancy doctrine should at least have the effect of inducing online businesses 
to treat minors fairly and avoid outrageous TOS provisions.  This treatment 
will minimize the risk of dissatisfaction, which leads to disaffirmation of 
their contracts.  Minors who enter fair transactions for products they want in 
transactions that go smoothly are unlikely to seek to avoid the contract.  The 
infancy doctrine is admirable, although currently ineffective, as a 
preventative mechanism encouraging the responsible exercise of the 
dominant power held by companies that would otherwise insist on imposing 
adhesive contracts with overreaching clauses on vulnerable populations. 
In addition, perhaps a more ethical approach to tapping the teen market 
would include affirmative efforts to encourage the involvement of a parent.  
Although the discussion about youth safety on the Internet is highly 
contentious, most experts agree that players in the Internet industry need to 
help parents “be more actively engaged in stewarding young people’s 
adoption of technology and safe practices.  They need accurate information 
about risks, solid implementable ideas for the home, places to go to learn 
more, and clear information about what to do if a problem arises.”287  The 
risks to children of a marketplace that comes into their homes at any hour of 
the day and night and is accessible with a click include the risk of incurring 
legal and financial obligations without sufficient understanding.288  Of 
course, some parents may be unenthusiastic about taking time to open 
accounts with online vendors that allow them to supervise (and assume 
contractual liability) for the online activity of minors.  Some minors will be 
equally unenthusiastic about cluing in their parents to their online lives.  But 
an ethical business will be willing to facilitate the involvement of parents. 
Another solution for online businesses that are unwilling to reduce the 
risk by writing balanced contracts for quality products and services or by 
involving parents, is to adjust their practices.  The most obvious measure is 
to conduct some reasonable age investigation.  Although such an 
investigation would not be foolproof, an OSP has a defense if it investigates 
a representation of age with sufficient caution so that reliance on it is in 
 
 287.  YOUTH SAFETY ON A LIVING INTERNET: REPORT OF THE ONLINE SAFETY AND TECHNOLOGY 
WORKING GROUP 33 (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/ 
OSTWG_Final_Report_070610.pdf.  The predominately industry writers of this report argue that 
“research . . . shows that many young people have adopted and continue to adopt effective strategies 
to deflect dangers from both adult criminals and their misbehaving peers.  [But t]his is not to suggest 
that youth don’t need adult supervision and support . . . .”  Id. at 33–34. 
 288.  See id. at 16. 
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good faith.  As explained above in Part II.D,289 the OSPs of many of the 
most popular online services may include a recital of adulthood somewhere 
in a TOS, but they take no efforts to draw sufficient attention to the 
representation to credibly argue it was made knowingly.  They, for the most 
part, ignore the contrary birthdates that users enter to open an account.  And 
they undertake no investigation efforts.  The existing exception for 
fraudulent misrepresentation is therefore entirely unavailing.  This total 
inaction does not mean that notice and reasonable investigation practices are 
impossible to implement.  If digital marketers wanted to take seriously 
avoiding contracts with minors, options for verifying age must be explored.  
But it is disingenuous for them to argue difficulties with age verification as 
an objection to the infancy doctrine.  So far, most OSPs are not taking even 
the simple verification steps they know how to take to avoid dealing with 
pre-teens.  If they wanted to avoid dealing with all minors, they could do at 
least that much. 
The elephant in the room is, of course, that such measures will naturally 
reduce the number of minors with whom to do business.  And online 
businesses are greedy.  If OSPs choose not to take these precautions, they 
have the choice to simply absorb the business losses associated with 
occasional disaffirmance.  But courts ought not come to their rescue.  So we 
return full circle to the policy of protecting minors.  Responsible businesses 
have options, but not cost-free options. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Minors have long been viewed as deserving protections from adults and 
from themselves in making economic and legal decisions.  The infancy 
doctrine is still on the books and, despite some muddled verbiage, no 
doctrinal development suggests that it is not applicable to online contracts.  
Using benefits derived under the contract, making unknowing 
representations of age, and exercising exceptional computer savvy will not 
deprive a minor of the right to void a TOS.  Simply using the doctrine for its 
express purposes is not bad faith, although, in fact, both conniving and 
innocent adults who deal with minors will pay the price the doctrine extracts.  
Steering adults away from hard bargaining with minors, such as evidenced 
by TOS, is the point.  While there are some defenses and exceptions to the 
infancy doctrine, including one for bad faith, the vast majority of online 
TOS are squarely subject to avoidance. 
The rush of teens into the market may require a meaningful inquiry into 
the policies of the infancy doctrine, but the arena in which to begin that 
discussion should not be TOS.  Contract abuses are particularly prevalent in 
 
 289.  See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
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TOS formation and terms.  Further, the processes of online contracting 
encourage thoughtless and impulsive behavior, a problem particularly 
troubling for teens already prone to these qualities. 
Notwithstanding the infancy doctrine, a look at the market reveals adults 
are more than willing to contract with minors; they affirmatively woo them.  
One risk is nonpayment, or a demand for refund, when a contract is voided.  
Some protections are built into online transactions because of the use of 
credit cards frequently tied to parents’ accounts.  But minors are not limited 
to credit cards and, more importantly, recourse against a parent for the price 
does not mean that the other TOS terms will be enforceable against anyone.  
TOS provide certain economic benefits to OSPs, some quite legitimately, 
although others may be overreaching.  Contract avoidance under the infancy 
doctrine thus presents a significant threat to businesses relying on minors.  
But until legislatures or courts thoughtfully rewrite the doctrine, it will apply 
even in cyberspace. 
Certainly, the infancy doctrine may become an unmanageable factor in 
digital market economics.  But dramatic changes without serious 
consideration of historical values and long-term implications ought not occur 
in an arena where the temptation to commit contract abuses is apparent and 
in a judicial context where consumer protection is undervalued.  At least 
with respect to TOS, in this imbalance, the infancy doctrine should be 
enforced—and perhaps publicized to encourage its use. 
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